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COURTS AS FORUMS FOR PROTEST

Jules Lobel

For almost half a century, scholars, judges and politicians have debated two
competing models of the judiciary's role in a democratic society. The mainstream
model views courts as arbiters of disputes between private individuals asserting
particularrights. The reform upsurge of the 1960s and 1970s led many to argue
that courts are not merely forums to settle private disputes, but can also be used as
instruments of societal change. Academics termed the emerging model the "public
law" or "institutionalreform" model.
The ongoing debate between these two views of the judicialrole has obscured a
third model of the role of courts in a democratic society. This model has been
largely ignored by legal scholars and viewed as illegitimate by some courts. The third,
alternativeperspective views courts as forums for protest. Under this model, courts
not only function as adjudicatorsof private disputes, or institutions that implement
social reforms, but as arenas where political and social movements agitate for, and
communicate, their legal and political agenda.
The courts as forums for protest model differs from the traditional, private
dispute model and the institutionallaw reform model, the two models traditionally
described by legal scholars. The reduced emphasis on winning or losing and the
lesser role of the judge are two features that distinguish this model from the others.
Our nation has seen a long traditionof litigators and movements using the courts
as platforms for arguing controversial positions and garnering public support for
them. From the Revolutionary period, through this country's struggle with the
issues of slavery and women's suffrage, up until modern instances where private
citizens and public officials have attempted to challenge governmental actions, our
system's courts have been used as forums to stir debate by the citizenry.
Because of the importance of encouragingpeople to engage in discussion about
current social issues, and because of the implications for freedom of speech, courts
should not allow sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure II or other
similar rules to stifle popular debate stirred by lawsuits that may be considered
*
Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law School. I want to thank my research
assistants, Jason Hess and Maggie Schuetz, for their research help, and the University of Pittsburgh
Document Technology Center for invaluable assistance in preparing this Article. The feedback I
received from my presentations at faculty colloquia at Stanford Law School, Boston University
School of Law and New York Law School also was incredibly helpful. I also want to thank Karen
Engro, Jeffrey Fogel, Susan Koniak, Staughton Lynd, John Parry, Michael Ratner, and Rhonda
Wasserman for their helpful comments on a draft of this Article, and Dean David Herring of the
University of Pittsburgh Law School for his generous support. Portions of this Article draw upon my
previous work, Success Without Victory: Lost Legal Battles and the Long Road to Justice in America.
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"frivolous" because they argue against precedent or are viewed as losing cases.
Bringinga lawsuit to generate publicity for one's cause should not be viewed as
an improper or frivolous purpose under Rule I.
Under the courts as forums for protest model, judges will often find themselves
in a difficult position: They will be faced with a situation where legal precedent and
social and political reality collide. Though articulatinga legal principle while deciding
a case without enforcing that principle may seem problematic, judges should feel
comfortable doing so when it is necessary in order to encourage society and
governmental actors to remedy an injustice that will otherwise continue unchecked.
Finally, progressive attorneys should adapt to this model as well. Realizing
that litigation is part of an overall strategy that should include publicity and other
forms of political action, they should become involved with the groups and movements they represent, and shape their litigation strategiesso that they will dovetail
with the overall goals of those movements.
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Courts as Forums for Protest

INTRODUCTION

For almost half a century, scholars, judges and politicians have debated
two competing models of the judiciary's role in a democratic society. The
mainstream model views courts as arbiters of disputes between private individuals asserting particular rights.' As former Reagan Administration Solicitor
General Charles Fried wrote, "[c]ourts should be the impartial tool for doing
justice between man and man."2
The reform upsurge of the 1960s and 1970s witnessed a transformation
in the role of the judiciary, particularly the federal judiciary. Courts were
now often viewed not merely as forums to settle private disputes, but as instruments of societal change. Harvard Professor Abram Chayes termed the emerging
model one of "public law litigation."3 This new model emphasized the court's
power to remedy structural, constitutional or statutory violations; as Professor
Chayes put it: "[tihe centerpiece of the emerging public law model is the
decree." The difference in relief between the two models was not itself
decisive; what was fundamental to the new conception was the judiciary's role
in implementing social change and not simply ordering private relationships.
One prominent critic perceived that the new model urged that lawsuits "be
recast so they would not just be disputes between individuals over their
particular grievances but political struggles in which judges could reorder
whole institutions and change the fundamental nature of society."'
The ongoing debate between these two views of the judicial role has
obscured a third model of the role of courts in a democratic society. This
model has been largely ignored by legal scholars and viewed as illegitimate
by some courts. The third, alternative perspective views courts as forums
for protest. Under this model, courts not only function as adjudicators of
private disputes, or institutions that implement social reforms, but as arenas
where political and social movements agitate for, and communicate, their
legal and political agenda.
1.
See, e.g., MORRIS RAPHAEL COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 251-52 (1933);
Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 57 (1991).
2.
3.
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976); see also Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).
4.
Chayes, supra note 3, at 1298. But see Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term
Foreword: Public Law Litigationand the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 58 (1982) (noting that it is
"the nature of the controversy, the sources of the governing law, and the consequent... impact of
the decision-rather than the form of relief-[that] differentiate public law from private law
adjudication").
5.
FRIED, supra note 2, at 16.
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While victory is the important index of success in the first two views
of the role of litigation, winning in court is not as essential in the forums for
protest model. Of course, the litigators and their clients certainly hope, and
at times expect to win in court, but their objective is broader than courtroom victory. They seek not merely the damages awarded to private litigators
under the traditional model, nor the injunction of the public law model, but
rather to use the courtroom struggle to build a political movement. The litigation can serve a variety of roles: to articulate a constitutional theory
supporting the aspirations of the political movement, to expose the conflict
between the aspirations of law and its grim reality, to draw public attention to
the issue and mobilize an oppressed community, or to put public pressure on a
recalcitrant government or private institution to take a popular movement's
grievances seriously. What is crucial is that judicial relief not be viewed as allencompassing; such relief is important but is not the sole goal of the litigation.
The forums for protest model thus breaks down the traditional barrier
between law and politics, but in a fundamentally different way than the law
reform model. The traditional model attempts to shield the judicial process
from the supposedly unsavory influence of politics, while the law reform
model views politics as a necessary predicate to the courtroom drama. In the
third model, the relationship between law and politics is reversed; a significant point of many of the cases is to inspire political action. The legal
struggle is thus a part of a broader political campaign, not the engine of
change itself. Courts are not the prime movers of social change; instead, they
are one forum in which the struggle for societal change occurs. Even when
public interest lawsuits prevail in court, often their most lasting legacy is not
the relief ordered by the court, but the lawsuit's contribution to the ongoing
community discourse about an important public issue.
Some courts have questioned whether litigation brought for the purpose
of provoking public dialogue and debate is legitimate. For example, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia imposed Rule 11 sanctions on
the attorneys for fifty-five Libyan citizens and residents who sued for damages
resulting from the 1986 United States air strike on Libya.6 Although the
district court found that plaintiffs' counsel, including the former United
States Attorney General Ramsey Clark, "surely knew" that "[t]he case offered
no hope whatsoever of success," and that it had been "brought as a public
statement of protest" against President Reagan's actions,7 it declined to
impose Rule 11 sanctions because federal courts "serve in some respects as a
6.
7.

Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319,322 (D.D.C. 1988).
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forum for making such statements, and should continue to do so.' The court
of appeals, however, held that Rule 11 sanctions were warranted because "[w]e
do not conceive it a proper function of a federal court to serve as a forum
for 'protests."' 9
Commentators have criticized the decision of the court of appeals.'" Yet
even some forceful critics agree that "courts do not exist as public forums.""
But, as this Article demonstrates, from the early history of the American
Republic onward, political movements have used courts to further public debate
on important constitutional issues. Indeed, as one commentator has noted, "a
considerable amount of civil rights litigation is in some sense a 'public statement of protest.""' 2
In recent years, groups at both ends of the legal and political spectrum
have used courts as arenas to educate the public. The lawsuit recently decided
by the United States Supreme Court challenging the Bush Administration's
detention of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, had as an important goal
sparking national and international outcry against these unlawful detentions.' 3
African American activists have filed reparations lawsuits against corporations,
as well as the U.S. government, whose histories are entangled with slavery, seeking to generate "societal discussion" about the role commercial entities and the
U.S. government played in the slave trade and slavery.' 4 Lawyers for Haitian
8.
Id.
886 F.2d at 440.
9.
E.g., Carl Tobias, Rule 11 Recalibrated in Civil Rights Cases, 36 VILL. L.REV. 105, 118-19
10.
(1991); Anthony D'Amato, The Imposition of Attorney Sanctions for Claims Arising From the U.S. Air
Raid on ibya, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 705 (1990).
11.
D'Amato, supra note 10, at 706.
12.
Tobias, supra note 10, at 118.
Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cit. 2003), rev'd sub nor. Rasul v. Bush,
13.
124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002), affd sub nom. Al Odah,
321 F.3d 1134. 1 am the Vice President of the Center for Constitutional Rights, the organization
that represents the plaintiffs in the Rasul case, and have been involved in that case.
14.
See Matthew Kauffman & Kenneth R. Gosselin, Suits Certain to Stir Debate on Reparations,
PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 7, 2002, at A10 (discussing the educative value of the reparation
lawsuits); Tony Pugh et al., First Suit by Slave Descendant Seeks Reparations, PITTS. POST-GAZETTE,
Mar. 27, 2002, at A10 (noting that lawsuits are important for providing a forum for plaintiffs' political
and historical arguments); see also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1995);
Johnson v. United States, No. C 94-1474 BAC, 1994 WL 225179 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 1994); Obadele
v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 432 (2002); Scott v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 659 A.2d 341 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1995); Van B. Luong, Recent Development, Political Interest Convergence: African
American Reparations and the Image of American Democracy, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 253, 262 (2002)
(citing plaintiffs' complaint in Farmer-Paellmann v. Fleetboston Financial Corp., No. CV-02-1862
(E.D.N.Y.) (filed Mar. 26, 2002) and other reparations cases, and arguing that the complaints play a
valuable role to "invite discussion and debate"); Note, Bridging the Color Line: The Power of AfricanAmerican Reparations to Redirect America's Future, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1689 (2002) (describing the
importance of the reparations lawsuits).
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refugees challenged various aspects of the Coast Guard's interdiction and
return of Haitian refugees, 5 with an objective of keeping the refugee issue
alive politically. 6 During the Vietnam War, countless lawsuits were filed with
an aim to focus the public on the unconstitutional nature of the U.S. war in
Indochina,"2 and more recent wars have inspired similar lawsuits.'
Conservative political groups and individuals have also attempted to use
the courts as forums to draw public attention to particular issues. The backers
of the Paula Jones case undoubtedly brought and continued that litigation to
advance conservative political causes and to embarrass President Clinton.'9
Antiabortion activists have supported pro-life legislation, concluding that
even if they lose the ensuing court challenge over its constitutionality, the
battle is valuable in educating the American people regarding their stance on
abortion." Gun owners have used the courts to garner public attention for their
Second Amendment concerns."
Recognizing the legitimacy of litigation brought to spark public debate
on an issue, to galvanize a political movement, or to spotlight social injustice
would have three important consequences for courts, lawyers, and social
movements. First, it would require narrowing the judicial definition of frivolous or improper litigation subject to Rule 11 sanctions. More importantly,
accepting this perspective would require litigants and lawyers to assess the
appropriateness of a given legal strategy not solely by the likelihood of success
in court, but also by the role it plays in advancing a popular movement."
Most fundamentally, it would require looking at law reform litigation, and
15.
See Harold Hongju Koh, The "HaitiParadigm" in United States Human Rights Policy, 103
YALE L.J. 2391, 2401 (1994); Michael Ratner, How We Closed the Guantanamo HIV Camp: The
Intersectionof Politics and Litigation, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 187, 193 (1998).
16.
See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 208 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("The refugees attempting to escape from Haiti... demand only that the United States, land of refugees
and guardian of freedom, cease forcibly driving them back to detention, abuse, and death.").
17.
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cit. 1973).
18.
See, e.g., Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133 (1st Cit. 2003) (soldiers and members of Congress
litigated the constitutionality of the 2003 war against Iraq); Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C.
Cir. 2000) (members of Congress challenged war in Kosovo as violative of the War Powers Resolution);
Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990) (congressional challenge to the constitutionality
of President George Herbert Walker Bush initiating war again in Iraq in 1990 without congressional
authorization).
19.
See Carol Rice Andrews, Jones v. Clinton: A Study in Politically Motivated Suits, Rule 11,
and the First Amendment, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1. President Clinton alleged that it was a "politically
inspired lawsuit." Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118,1123 (E.D. Ark. 1999).
20.
See Richard W. Stevenson, Bush Signs Ban on a Procedurefor Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
6, 2003, at Al; Robin Toner, For G.O.P., It's a Moment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2003, at Al.
21.
See Michael Janofsky, Gun Owners Take Their Concerns to Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 20,

2002, at A10.
22.
See ARTHUR KINOY, RIGHTS ON TRIAL 71 (1983).
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often even private litigation, in terms of its interaction and interface with
political movements and not as an isolated legal struggle. This perspective not
only brings politics into the courtroom; it also drags the courtroom into politics.
Part I of this Article contrasts the traditional and structural reform model
of litigation with what I term the courts as forums for protest model. Part II
demonstrates that this type of litigation has a lengthy pedigree in American
history. Part III focuses on the First Amendment values promoted by this type
of litigation and the protection it should be accorded. Part IV addresses the
implications of this analysis on how judges might address the tensions between
judicial articulation of norms and the enforcement of those norms that are
ever-present in law reform litigation. Part V will assess the broader implications for lawyers and their clients of using courts as forums for protest, and
evaluate the pitfalls and advantages of this type of litigation, as well as the
possible tensions it raises between law and politics.
I. LAW REFORM LITIGATION AND THE COURTS AS FORUMS FOR
PROTEST MODEL
The successful law reform litigation of the 1950s and 1960s spawned an
ongoing debate among scholars over the legitimacy and efficacy of judicially
imposed reforms. Legal scholars focused on the legitimacy of this litigation.
In seminal articles, Professor Abram Chayes and Professor Owen Fiss argued
that structural, public law litigation was displacing the traditional dispute
resolution lawsuit as the dominant form of adjudication in the late twentieth
century.23 The traditional model of adjudication posited a bipolar conflict
between individual private parties before a neutral, detached, mostly passive
judge to determine whether a legal right had been violated and whether damages
should be awarded. The point of such a lawsuit was to decide a concrete
grievance or dispute, not to address some general problem of public policy.
The public structural lawsuit, on the other hand, contained a multiplicity of parties and interests, often taking the form of a class action. It was
not a dispute about private rights, but rather a dispute over issues of public
policy. The fact inquiry was not simply retrospective, but predictive and thus
quasi-legislative. Most important, the judge was not a passive, detached arbiter,
but rather an active agent who shaped and organized the litigation to ensure
a just and workable outcome. The relief imposed typically was not damages,24
but an injunctive decree that often required ongoing judicial supervision.
23.
24.

Chayes, supra note 3; Fiss, supra note 3.
Chayes, supra note 3, at 1302; Fiss, supra note 3, at 18-28.
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The function of this structural, public lawsuit was not to accord damages for a
discrete private wrong, but rather to change the behavior of a large
bureaucratic organization.
Both Professors Chayes and Fiss viewed the rise of the structural lawsuit
as linked to the development of a regulatory, administrative bureaucratic state.
The dispute resolution model was based on a system of autonomous, individual
entrepreneurs operating in the largely unregulated marketplace, while the
structural reform lawsuit reflects a world in which the state, corporations and
large bureaucracies play dominant roles. In this modem world, the role of federal
courts was transformed from primarily solving private disputes, to policing the
interface between large state institutions, such as schools, prisons, child welfare
systems, and the citizenry.25
The legitimacy of the court's role in restructuring institutions has come
under persistent attack. Some criticize the federal judiciary's move away from
concrete "grievance answering" to more generalized problem solving.26
Alexander Bickel complained that "[aill too many federal judges have been
induced to view themselves as holding roving commissions as problem
solvers, and as charged with a duty to act when majoritarian institutions do
not."27 Many viewed judges as thwarting the will of the more democratic
organs of government."
The courts and Congress have also battled over the propriety of reform
litigation. Justice Powell's influential concurrence in United States v.
Richardson29 reflects the concerns of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts regarding structural reform litigation:
Due to what many have regarded as the unresponsiveness of the
Federal Government to recognized needs or serious inequities in our
society, recourse to the federal courts has attained an unprecedented
popularity in recent decades. Those courts have often acted as a major
instrument of social reform.... [W]e risk a progressive impairment of
the effectiveness of the federal courts if their limited resources are
diverted increasingly from their historic role to the resolution of
public-interest suits brought by litigants who cannot distinguish
25.
26.

Chayes, supra note 3, at 1304; Fiss, supra note 3, at 44.
DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 7-9 (1977).

27.
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 134 (1970).
28.
See generally RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 314 (1977) (surveying competing views of judicial review and
stating that 'Icling to faith in the ultimate good sense of the people; I cannot subscribe to the theory
that America needs a savior.., in the shape of... nine-of times only five-Platonic Guardians."
(citation omitted)).
29.
418 U.S. 166 (1974).

Courts as Forums for Protest

485

themselves from all taxpayers or all citizens.... It merits noting how
often and how unequivocally the Court has expressed its antipathy to
efforts to convert the Judiciary into an open forum for the resolution of
3°
political or ideological disputes about the performance of government.

Congress has fought over a host of proposals to limit federal courts jurisdiction
to hear and remedy institutional reform cases, and has enacted legislation to
limit prison litigation3 and to restrict the ability of Legal Services Lawyers to
engage in class action or other structural reform cases."
While the traditional dispute resolution model of adjudication and its
more recent structural reform competitor are widely divergent, they have some
basic similarities. Both are jurocentric, meaning they focus on the judge as the
central actor in resolving disputes. Professor Fiss' "conception of adjudication
starts from the top---the office of the judge-and works down."33 "At the core
of structural reform is the judge, and his effort to give meaning to our public
values."34 While the dispute resolution model accords the judge a more passive
5
role, it is also fundamentally concerned with defining the role of the judge. In
addition, both models see the judicial grant of relief as critical to the lawsuit,
whether it be the award of damages or the implementation of a decree.
Important, recent work by social scientists raises questions about both
the traditional legal model and its structural reform competitor. In the 1970s
and 1980s, political and social scientists engaged in a debate parallel to the
legal dispute over the legitimacy of law reform litigation. The social science
discussion did not, however, focus primarily on the proper role of the courts,
or the competence of the judiciary to restructure political or social institutions. Rather, social scientists debated the question of whether the judiciary's
decisions really had the effect of changing society.
The publication of Gerald Rosenberg's The Hollow Hope sparked the
debate. Rosenberg argued that the federal courts-even in such celebrated cases
as Brown v. Board of Education36 and Roe v. Wade37-were largely ineffectual,
Id. at 191-92 (Powell, J., concurring).
30.
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. VIII, § 802, 110 Stat.
31.
1321, 1321-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2000)).
See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
32.
Fiss, supra note 3, at 41.
33.
Id. at 17.
34.
See Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal
35.
Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 58 (2001) ("The jurocentric approach to legal scholarship is best
exemplified by the legal process school."); Anthony J. Sebok, ReadingThe Legal Process, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 1571, 1584 (1996) (reviewing HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS (1994)).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
36.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
37.
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and perhaps even counterproductive, in producing social change. Rosenberg
concluded that "U.S.courts can almost never be effective producers of significant social reform."38 To Rosenberg "courts act as 'fly paper'for social reformers
39
who succumb to the 'lure of litigation.'
Rosenberg's conclusions have been challenged by a host of social scientists.
Most of these academics agree with Rosenberg that judicial decisions by themselves rarely lead to social change, and that reliance on courts and judges often
proves counterproductive for political and social movements. These social scientists focused, however, on the indirect effects of litigation. For scholars such as
Michael McCann, Stuart Schiengold, and Joel Handler, who all studied social
movements, the indirect effects and uses of litigation may be its most important
aspects for social movements seeking change.4" Social movements' use of litigation to mobilize political struggles, to gain favorable publicity, to build a political
movement, to generate support for political and constitutional claims, and
to provide leverage to supplement other tactics and force the opposition to
settle is the central thrust of these scholars' research. Their body of work takes
the position that "although the litigation by itself may not always produce
immediate and sweeping results, it can function as part of an effective political
strategy for achieving social reform."' Empirical studies in such disparate
areas as pay equity reform litigation,42 disability rights cases,43 school financial
reform litigation, 4 environmental and consumer litigation, 45 and civil rights
organizing46 have demonstrated the significant indirect benefits that litigation
can achieve for plaintiffs who use courts to mobilize public sentiment or to
provide leverage for their claims. This social science research must be integrated
into the debate among legal scholars over the proper role of the federal judiciary.

38.
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 338 (1991).

39.
40.

Id. at 341.

42.
43.

See MCCANN, supranote 40, at 46-47.
See Susan M. Olson, The Political Evolution of Interest Group Litigation, in GOVERNING

JOEL F. HANDLER,- SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 210 (1978);
MICHAEL MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL
MOBILIZATION 10 (1994); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS,
PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 96 (1974).
41.
SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, PITIFUL PLAINTIFFS: CHILD WELFARE LITIGATION AND THE
FEDERAL COURTS 5-6 (2000).

THROUGH COURTS 225, 239 (Richard A.L. Gambitta et al. eds., 1981).
44.
See Richard A.L. Gambitta, Litigation, JudicialDeference and Policy Change, in GOVERNING
THROUGH COURTS, supra note 43, at 259.
45.
See HANDLER, supranote 40, at 69, 97.
46.
See Francesca Polletta, The Structural Context of Novel Rights Claims: Southern Civil Rights
Organizing, 1961-1966,34 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 367,385-86 (2000).
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A. The Courts as Forums for Protest Model
The work of these social scientists requires that legal scholars conceptualize an alternative, third model of litigation not to displace, but to exist
alongside the traditional dispute resolution and law reform models. If the most
important effect of winning law reform cases potentially does not lie in the
judicial relief awarded, but in the indirect effects of the litigation on society,
than a reconceptualization of the Chayes/Fiss law reform paradigm is necessary.
What I term the courts as forums for protest model would have several
key characteristics that would distinguish it from both of the other two
prominent paradigms.
1.

Winning or Losing in Court is Not as Important as Influencing the
Public Debate

The lawyers' and plaintiffs' interest in the lawsuit is not solely winning
or losing in court, but in getting their message out to the broader public or a
particular group. The lawsuit serves as a means for the plaintiffs and their
counsel to transform the court into a forum to broadcast their point of view.
While the plaintiffs do have a legal claim that they believe is valid and want
the court to decide, they also seek to use the litigation as a vehicle for their
protest, and as a catalyst for aiding or developing a broader social movement.
The efficacy of lawsuits in generating publicity has been well documented.
Social scientists have observed "that litigation is one of the most effective
ways to win publicity for a cause." 7 Public interest litigators and organizations
have come to view litigation as a vehicle for attracting the media. Reflecting
this recognition, it is now a common practice to announce a pending or filed
public interest lawsuit at a press conference." Often, litigation attracts the
49
media's attention in a way that nothing else does. Professor Joel Handler
concludes that in general "a 20-page complaint and a temporary injunction
0
are worth more than a 300 page report in the media."" Professor Handler
discusses a category of litigation he studied where
[tihe tactic that distinguishes these cases is that the law reformers do not
expect to achieve results through a court or administrative order; such
proceedings will take too long or become too costly .... Rather, they
MCCANN, supra note 40, at 58; see also HANDLER, supra note 40, at 216.
47.
A LEXIS search of a six-month period between July 1 and December 31, 2003 revealed
48.
at least forty-five lawsuits that were announced by way of a press conference.
See MCCANN, supra note 40, at 58-62.
49.
HANDLER, supra note 40, at 216.
50.
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use legal proceedings to generate harmful publicity that will force the
discriminator into a settlement.51

The educational value of litigation is often substantial even where the
case does not result in a legal victory. Professor Michael McCann demonstrates
that pay equity advocates used lawsuits as "a crucial organizing tool," and that
for many of the activists "[w]hether you win or lose [in court], awareness rises
through this type of action." 2 For Professor McCann, while the pay equity
litigation resulted in only modest policy reforms, "perhaps the single most important achievement of the movement has been the transformations in many
working women's understandings, commitments, and affiliations."53 Similarly,
Professor Richard Gambitta studied the impact of the school finance case,
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,54 which challenged the
constitutionality of financing education by means of local property taxes on
the ground that it produced substantial disparities in per pupil expenditures
between rich and poor school districts. 5 Although the plaintiffs lost in the
Supreme Court,5 6 Gambitta concluded that the litigation nevertheless influenced
the legislative agenda. Thus, even ultimately defeated litigation "can recast
the nature of a debate," and "facilitate debates that otherwise may not occur,
thus setting in motion, at times, the process of policy change."57
This social science research is buttressed by the experience of the bar.
For example, William Colby, the Cruzan family's attorney in their famous
"right-to-die case""s that lost in the Supreme Court, explained:
[Tihe public discourse surrounding the cases quickly took on a life of
its own. The true legacy of the two cases is that they caused [the
country] to talk about death, dying, living wills, hospital ethics committees, and the withdrawal of futile medical treatment and who
should make that decision. This nationwide discussion very quickly

51.
Id. at 214.
52.
MCCANN, supra note 40, at 70-71 (quoting CSA activist Sharon Krachunis) (alteration
in original).
53.
Id. at 230.
54.
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
55.
Gambitta, supra note 44.
56.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1.
57.
Gambitta, supra note 44, at 277. Professor John Denvir demonstrated that ineffective
litigation against racial discrimination in voting spurred Congress to enact the 1965 Voting Rights Act.
John Denvir, Towards a PoliticalTheory of Public Interest Litigation,54 N.C. L.REV. 1133, 1140 (1976).
58.
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). The parents of Nancy
Cruzan, a young woman who was in a vegetative state after an automobile accident, challenged the
hospital's refusal to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from her as violative of the due process clause
of the U.S. Constitution. Id.
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outgrew the individual lawsuits of two young girls involved in car
accidents."

Similarly, Yale Professor Harold Koh's experience in transnational
public law litigation led him to view such litigation "as a development whose
success should be measured not by favorable judgments, but by practical
results: the norms declared, the political pressure generated, the government
practices abated, and the lives saved."' For Professor Koh, even "adverse
Supreme Court decisions are no longer final stops, but only way stations, in
the process of 'complex enforcement. ' '6
The recent litigation involving the suspected Taliban and Al Qaeda
prisoners indefinitely detained by the Bush Administration at the U.S. military installation at Guantanamo Bay without any legal process is but another
example. The lower courts uniformly rejected the prisoners' petitions for
habeas corpus relief. Nonetheless, the litigation received a significant amount
of press attention and helped keep the issue in the public eye for almost two
years. That public pressure undoubtedly contributed to the Supreme Court's
decision to hear the case, and eventually reverse the judgment of the court
of appeals.
2.

A Non-Jurocentric Model of Litigation

As already noted, both the traditional dispute resolution model and the
Chayes/Fiss structural or reform model of litigation focus on the role of the
judge. The recent social science research has concentrated not on the topdown model of judges dispensing decisions to the litigants, but on a more
bottom-up, decentralized model that analyzes the interaction between the
parties to the litigation and their interface with society. From this perspective,
the judge and judicial decision or judicial decree are not the epicenter of
litigation from which all else radiates. Rather "[s]ocial struggles themselves
thus define the center of analysis, and nonjudicial actors are viewed
6 2 as practical
command.
judicial
to
reactors
simply
as
than
rather
legal agents
The diminished role of the judge in this decentralized, bottom-up model
is inextricably connected to the lessened concern over winning and losing in
William H. Colby, Media and the "Right to Die": A Personal Reflection, 14 REV. LITIG.
59.
619, 622 (1995), quoted in Erwin Chemerinsky, Silence is Not Golden: Protecting Lawyer Speech
Under the First Amendment, 47 EMORY L.J. 859, 870-71 (1998).
Koh, supra note 15, at 2399; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law
60.
Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2371-72 (1991).
Koh, supra note 15, at 2406.
61.
Michael W. McCann, Reform Litigation on Trial, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 715, 731 (1992).
62.
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court. If the role of the court is reconceptualized from authoritative law
givers to that of a forum whereby grievances and complaints can be aired and
argued, the critical question for the litigation is not what the eventual decree
or decision states, but how the litigation affects the various actors in the policy
arena-whether those actors are the public in general, interest groups,
legislative bodies, a group the litigants are seeking to organize, or the
defendants whom the plaintiffs are seeking to force to the bargaining table. As
one commentator has argued, the question for many areas of litigation is not
"[h]ow do judges make policy," but rather "[hiow do courts function as an
arena of policy disputation?"63
Even when plaintiffs win in court, it is a mistake to view the judge as
the central actor in the implementation of relief. Rather, one must recognize "the interdependence" of the courts, the media, activists, and other
branches of government "to achieve meaningful reform."'
Legal scholars focus primarily on analyzing judicial decisions: critiquing,
rationalizing, legitimating, and deconstructing them. Yet, by focusing so
extensively and centrally on judicial decisions and the role of the judge, legal
scholars risk missing the larger picture. That broader view is that judicial decisions represent only one incident in what is a rich, variegated and lengthy
process of resolving a grievance or public dispute. By focusing narrowly on the
judicial decision instead of the entire legal process, legal scholars fail to
understand the broader landscape within which the decision is situated.
Often real cases will present elements of both the forum for protest and
institutional reform models, for as with any model, reality is always more
complex and intricate than any theoretical or doctrinal formulation. Thus, in
many cases, litigants who seek to utilize courts to educate the public and mobilize
their social and political movements will also be demanding strong judicial
intervention to remedy an egregious constitutional violation. Moreover, while
certain cases may present the forum for protest model in its pure form, much
public interest litigation has as a purpose furthering public education and discourse, and in many cases the courtroom battle is but one aspect of a broader
political struggle. That many public law litigants have interests in the litigation
that extend beyond winning or losing in the courtroom has important implications for lawyers' strategies and tactics in litigating those cases and for
judicial responses to the litigation as part of a multifaceted political struggle.

63.

Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation as Litigation, 97

MICH. L. REV. 1994, 2000 (1999).
64.

655 (1993).

Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 639,
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The Legitimacy of the Courts as Forums for Protest Model

The model proposed here, however efficacious and widespread in public
law litigation, raises the question whether these kind of cases and legal
strategies are legitimate uses of the courtroom. Several types of problems
appear immediately. The first is whether a litigation strategy that seeks
favorable publicity to further a social movement is an ethical and legitimate
use of the courts. The second, and related problem is whether such a litigation strategy poses an improper purpose under Rule 11.
For the past century lawyers and judges have debated the proper role of
the lawyer in obtaining favorable media publicity. For example, in 1966, a
committee of the American Bar Association concluded that the proper role
of the lawyer "is to present his case in the courtroom, not... attempt[ I to
build a favorable climate of public opinion. 65 Various courts have also opined
at times that obtaining publicity is not a legitimate function of litigation. For
example, the Fourth Circuit recently denied attorney fees for public relations
work by attorneys in concluding a successful civil rights action, stating that
of litigation are almost always attained in the courtroom,
"[t]he legitimate goals
66
not in the media.,
The same unease over the use of publicity in connection with litigation
has also affected some law reform organizations. Felix Frankfurter, then a member of the ACLU's Executive Committee, criticized ACLU Executive Director
Roger Baldwin's distribution of a circular criticizing the government's
impending prosecution of a communist labor leader. Frankfurter "objected to
this... attempt to influence public sentiment," arguing that the case "must
be tried in the courts, not in the press or in a publicity campaign. '67 "The
ACLU Executive Committee eventually adopted Frankfurter's position, 'both
from a standpoint of effective tactics and general principle.' 66
Federal courts have also at times imposed Rule 11 sanctions on attorneys
who have used the courtroom as a forum for public protest. The D.C. Circuit's
imposition of sanctions in Saltany v. Reagan69 against former Attorney General
65.
AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 92 (1966).
66.
Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 1994). Even courts
that have allowed attorney fees for public relations work have articulated a narrow standard that only
permits attorney fees for media work that contributes "directly and substantially, to the attainment of
[the client's] litigation goals." Davis v. City of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1545 (9th Cit. 1992).
67.
David M. Rabban, The Free Speech League, the ACLU, and Changing Conceptions of Free
Speech in American History, 45 STAN. L. REV. 47, 102-03 (1992).
68.
Id. at 103 (quoting Minutes of ACLU Executive Committee Meeting (Mar. 18, 1923),
in Felix Frankfurter Papers Container 125 (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress)).
69.
886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cit. 1989).
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Ramsey Clark for what it termed his attempt to use the federal court as a
forum for protest in bringing claims on behalf of Libyans killed or injured
during the 1986 bombing is but one example." Another is the sanctions

imposed in In re Kunstler"'by the Fourth Circuit against the prominent civil
rights attorney William Kunstler and other attorneys. The circuit affirmed a
district court imposition of Rule 11 sanctions because Kunstler had filed a civil
rights lawsuit with a primary purpose of seeking publicity and embarrassing
the defendant. The court found that sanctions are appropriate even where a
complaint is filed to vindicate rights in court, as long as the litigant's central
purpose in bringing the lawsuit is "improper," such as seeking publicity.
Commentators have criticized Saltany and Kunstler,73 other courts have
disagreed that political education is an improper purpose,74 and Rule 11 was
amended in 1993 to make it more difficult to impose sanctions on litigants
and their attorneys. Nonetheless, the present Rule 11 still bars pleadings filed
for "any improper purpose." That text suggests that a court could sanction a
complaint filed for the purpose of seeking publicity, even if the primary

70.

In Saltany, Clark sought damages for his client resulting from tortious violations of

international law, including the United Nations Charter, committed by the United States and
United Kingdom in the 1986 U.S. air strike on Libya. Many commentators argued that those air
strikes were illegal under international law. See, e.g., D'Amato, supra note 10. However, the district
court and court of appeals held that U.S. law accorded immunity from suit for the U.S. and British
governments, President Reagan, Prime Minister Thatcher, and other senior civil and military U.S.
officials. Clark undoubtedly was attempting to raise the question of whether U.S. courts should
continue to grant immunity to the United States and other governments which commit egregious
violations of the laws of war and international law prohibiting aggressive war. He hoped to stir both
public debate and judicial consideration of the contradiction between the United States' actions at
Nuremberg imposing liability on the Nazi leaders for launching an aggressive war in violation of international law and committing war crimes, and the United States' continued refusal to apply those
same international norms to its own conduct.
71.
914 F.2d 505 (4th Cit. 1990).
72.
Id. at 520. Subsequently, in Ballentine v. Taco Bell Corp., 135 F.R.D. 117 (E.D.N.C.
1991), the district court imposed sanctions against the plaintiff in a sex discrimination case for filing
a claim to harass the defendant, despite concluding that the discrimination claim was arguably
colorable and filed with the legitimate motive of seeking to remedy the alleged discrimination. The
court found that the plaintiff had a dual motive in filing the lawsuit: the legitimate purpose of
seeking relief for the loss of his job and the improper purpose of harassing defendants which was
evidenced by plaintiffs remarks at a deposition that he sought to have one defendant fired from his
job. Id. at 125. More recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has imposed sanctions against an
attorney who filed what the court assumed was a nonfrivolous claim solely because his purpose was
improper. Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 332 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (imposing
sanctions on the plaintiffs lawyer because the lawyer's non-frivolous motion to enforce a judgment
had as a purpose to embarrass and harass defendant and to promote himself through the media).
73.
E.g., D'Amato, supra note 10; Tobias, supra note 10.
74.
Sussman v. Bank of Is., 56 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 1995); Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles,
780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986); Auen v. Sweeney, 109 F.R.D. 678, 680 (N.D.N.Y. 1986).
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purpose of the litigation were to vindicate rights. 5 The Rule 11 cases, such as
Saltany and Kunstler, the text of the Rule, and the controversy over the
ethical propriety of lawyers obtaining favorable media publicity for their clients,
illustrate the deep-seated doubts by some members of the legal community
about the propriety and legitimacy of the role for courts proposed in this Article.
II. THE HISTORY OF LITIGATION AS A FORUM
FOR PROTEST IN AMERICA
Legitimacy is fundamentally a function of several interrelated inquiries.
The first is historical: have courts played a role as forums for protest within
our historical tradition? The second is theoretical and doctrinal: does such a
function of courts and litigation fit comfortably within our constitutional
structure? This part will discuss the first inquiry.
Unlike structural reform litigation, which is a relatively new midtwentieth century phenomenon, the tradition of using litigation as a forum for
protest to obtain favorable publicity for a political cause dates back to before
the American Revolution. During the nineteenth century, abolitionists, civil
rights activists, and the early women's movement used the courts to further
their political agendas. In the eighteenth-century colonial struggle against
the British culminating in independence, lawyers used the courts to publicize
American grievances against the Crown. James Otis Jr.'s arguments both in
and outside of the courtroom using the case challenging the writs of assistance
to denounce England's whole policy toward the colonies were widely publicized,
including his famous speech, of which John Adams later wrote, "[t]hen and
there was the child Independence born."76 Similarly, when Adams represented John Hancock and others in the tax protests in Boston, he and his legal
colleagues worked closely with the press to publicize the abuses of the British.
Adams' contentions, and later a text of his argument, were thoroughly aired
75.
Andrews, supra note 19, at 23. Indeed, the Advisory Committee that wrote the 1983
Amendments to Rule 11 considered, but ultimately rejected inserting the word "primarily" into
the Rule to qualify the improper purpose clause. See Letter from Walter R. Mansfield, Chairman,
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to Judge Edward T. Gignoux, Chairman of the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Mar. 9, 1982), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 190, 191
(1983). That part of Rule 11 was not affect by the 1993 amendments.
76.
See JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, BETWEEN 1761

AND 1772, at 51-57, 469-82 (1865); 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 107 (L.Kinvin Wroth &
Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965); NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 58-59 (1937); see also Draper v.

United States, 358 U.S. 307, 317 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Otis' eloquent argument lost
the case but "rallied public opinion").
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by the press, along with commentaries on the important legal issues.77
Indeed, the evidence strongly supports the conclusion that Adams intended
his argument in that case "to serve a purpose beyond mere advocacy in
court."" Both the content and use "of the draft argument suggest that it was
as much a political as a legal document."79 These revolutionary lawyers were
using their cases not merely to defend their clients, but also to help build a
political movement for American independence.
The revolutionary tradition of using the courts as forums for protest was
continued by the abolitionist movement in the early nineteenth century.
Historian Hendrik Hartog has noted that the "contest over slavery did more
than any other cause to stimulate the development of an alternate, rights
conscious interpretation of the federal constitution."8 Much of the fugitive
slave litigation was geared not merely to winning in court, but to galvanizing
Northern public opinion against slavery. The lawyer who best used litigation
to further a political agenda and spark public debate over slavery was Salmon
Chase. Chase engaged in such political litigation on behalf of fugitive slaves
and their Underground Railroad supporters for more than a decade,
eventually using it as a springboard to become a U.S. Senator, Secretary of
the Treasury under Lincoln, and ultimately Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court.
In the mid-1830s both Chase and the abolitionist movement were at
turning points. Until then, abolitionism had been mainly a moral and religious
crusade that sought to abolish slavery by means of moral persuasion, not legal
or political action. Antislavery societies often resolved to use "no weapon
but reason and truth" in their campaign against slavery.8" Antislavery
litigation was utilized mainly as a "practical necessity" to defend abolitionists
against mobs and riots, "not as an ideological opportunity."82 But reason and
truth had not worked. Southerners had not been moved by moral persuasion
to end slavery, and by the 1830s, political abolitionists like James Birney

Brief of Petitioner at 17, Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991); 2 LEGAL
77.
PAPERS OFJOHN ADAMS, supra note 76, at 173-210; Panel Discussion: What to Do When Your Case Is
Front Page News, 14 REV. LITIG. 595, 608 (1995) (comments of Michael E. Tigar).
78.
2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 76, at 192 (editorial note) (Adams'
argument was probably never delivered).
Id. at 193.
79.
80.
Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and "The Rights That Belong to Us All,"
74 J. AM. HIST. 1013, 1017 (1987).
81.
JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER THE LAw 33 (1964).
82.

ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

160 (1975).

Courts as Forumsfor Protest

495

were developing constitutional theories that would provide legal and
political means for challenging slavery.
In 1837, Chase agreed to represent a twenty-year-old slave, Matilda
Lawrence, who had run away from her master and father while on a trip to
Cincinnati. s3 She found refuge with James Bimey, who hired her as a maid.
Her father hired a slave catcher, John M. Riley, who had located the runaway
and had her arrested pursuant to the federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.4
Chase's decision to represent Matilda Lawrence would begin a long
crusade earning him the nickname "Attorney General for Runaway Slaves,
and, although Chase lost most cases and freed very few slaves, both Chase
and the slavery issue catapulted to national prominence as a result of his
decision. In time, Chase would become the antislavery leader most responsible for the successful transition from moral outrage to political action. As the
New York Tribune later would write, "To Mr. Chase more than any other one
man belongs the credit of making the anti-slavery feeling, what it had never
been before, a power in politics. It had been the sentiment of philanthropists; he made it the inspiration of a great political party." 6 A significant part
of that effort was Chase's use of the courts as a forum for presenting his
antislavery views.
Chase's main strategy in his argument before Ohio Common Pleas
Judge David E. Estes seems to have been to use Matilda's case to challenge
the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793. While he did raise a
number of technical, legal arguments, he discussed those briefly. Chase
focused instead on broader constitutional points of natural rights, federalism,
and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. He did so over the objection of
opposing counsel and clear signals from the judge that Chase's discourse was
not pertinent. His opening and closing arguments were attempts to infuse
the U.S. Constitution with broad natural rights and an egalitarian moral
perspective. He "perceived" the court's responsibility as not merely to the
individual and community, "but to conscience and to God."87

83.

See STEPHEN MIDDLETON, OHIO AND THE ANTISLAVERY ACTIVITIES OF ATTORNEY

SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 1830-1849, at 96 (1990); JOHN NIVEN, SALMON P. CHASE: A
BIOGRAPHY 50 (1995).
MIDDLETON, supra note 83.
84.
NIVEN, supra note 83, at 50.
85.
ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN
86.
PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 74 (1970).
SPEECH OF SALMON P. CHASE IN THE CASE OF THE COLORED WOMAN, MATILDA,
87.
WHO WAS BROUGHT BEFORE THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
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Judge Estes listened patiently to Chase, but quickly ruled against him
based on the current state of the law. Slave catcher Riley quickly rushed
Matilda across the Ohio River to Covington, Kentucky and eventually to
New Orleans, where Lawrence had arranged for her sale.
The historian William Wiecik has termed Chase's Matilda argument "a
noble failure." Chase was saddened by the outcome of the case and felt that
his legal position had been "treated with ridicule or disregard."89 Yet, despite
Matilda's personal tragedy, Chase's mentor, the abolitionist James Birney,
believed that the case had "done much for the cause in this city."9 The litigation
had stirred considerable debate over fugitive slaves and slavery in Cincinnati.
Chase's focus on broad political arguments seems to have been designed not
merely to win before Judge Estes, but to help spur a political, constitutional
movement against slavery. In the Matilda case, Bimey and Chase had worked
out the legal theory that, while losing in court, was eventually to become the
constitutional platform of the Republican Party.
The Matilda case did not vanish with the unfortunate woman's return to
slavery. Birney was prosecuted for harboring a fugitive slave, and was found
guilty and fined. Birney decided not to pay the fine, and Chase filed an appeal.
Chase quickly realized that Judge Estes had made a technical error when he
charged the jury to consider only whether Bimey had harbored Matilda and
not whether he did so knowing that she was a slave. However, both he and
Birney agreed not to raise that issue on appeal, even though they knew they
would win if they did. Their interest lay in arguing the broad constitutional
issue of whether Matilda became free the moment she entered Ohio with her
master, not in "winning" the case and avoiding the fine.
The Ohio Supreme Court's decision disappointed Chase. The court
reversed Bimey's conviction, but only on the technical grounds not argued by
Chase that the jury had not considered whether Bimey had known Matilda
was a slave. Nonetheless, the Ohio Supreme Court took the unusual step of
ordering the publication of Chase's arguments in the case. In all likelihood, the
court agreed with Chase's arguments, but was unwilling to adopt them in Ohio's
political climate of the late 1830s. Thus, the court signaled its leanings by
having the argument printed and widely publicized.9
88.
WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 193 (1977).

89.

FONER, supra note 86, at 74.

90.
MIDDLETON, supra note 83, at 102.
91.
See ALBERT BUSHNELL HART, SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 74 (1899); J.W.
SCHUCKERS, THE LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 43-44 (1874).

Chase's argument is printed in Birney v. Ohio, 8 OHIO 230, 231-38 (1837).
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For the next decade, Chase actively represented fugitive slaves in Ohio
courts. His cases usually drew large crowds to the courtroom. He mostly
lost, although he occasionally was able to win his client's freedom. Most
important to Chase, however, was that his arguments were reaching a wider
national audience, and were touching a chord with Northerners who wanted
to dissociate free states from slavery.92
Chase's most famous case stemmed from his representation of an abolitionist involved in the underground railroad. His representation of John Van
Zandt, particularly his appeal to the Supreme Court, might be termed frivolous
or baseless in modem parlance. Yet, this case may have done more than any
other of Chase's cases to publicize the theories and positions that were to
motivate Northern public opinion to support a political movement that
eventually became the Republican Party.
On April 21, 1842, John Van Zandt, an old, stooped farmer who had
left Kentucky because of his hatred of slavery, was conducting nine fugitive
slaves north when his wagon was stopped by two slave catchers. The slave
driving the wagon fled, but the other eight were captured and rushed across
the Ohio River to Covington, Kentucky where their owner, Wharton Jones,
reclaimed them and paid the slave catchers $450.
Jones then sued Van Zandt for harboring fugitives in violation of the
Fugitive Slave Act. Chase agreed to take Van Zandt's case and-as usual in
his antislavery litigation-accepted no fee. He asked former U.S. Senator
Thomas Morris to aid him in the defense.
Chase was optimistic about the Van Zandt case. He recognized that
whatever the outcome in court, the case would get wide publicity for his antislavery constitutional views. Moreover, he thought he could win in court
despite the substantial evidence that Van Zandt was transporting slaves he
knew to be fugitives.
Chase had some good reasons to be optimistic about the Van Zandt
case. The case would be tried in federal court before Supreme Court Justice
John McLean, who was assigned to the Ohio District. Justice McLean, an
impressive looking man whose features and reserved demeanor resembled
those of George Washington, had strong antislavery views. Justice McLean
had ruled in favor of fugitive slaves when he was an Ohio Supreme Court
92.
For example, in the 1845 case of the State v. Hoppess, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 105 (1845),
Chase represented a slave named Sam Watson who Chase argued became free when the boat on
which he and his master were traveling docked in Cincinnati. Chase argued that since slavery
was against natural law, a slave was automatically freed when brought to a free state. Judge Read
accepted Chase's contentions, but held that Watson had not been brought into Ohio since the
boat had only docked in port. Id. at 117.
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Justice, and in 1842 had set forth his antislavery views in the U.S. Supreme
Court case of Priggv. Pennsylvania.93 Moreover, Justice McLean was Chase's
friend and soon to be uncle-in-law. It seemed that it would be difficult to
find a better federal judge to try the Van Zandt case.
Nevertheless, Justice McLean rejected Chase's motion to dismiss the
case, and a jury ultimately awarded Jones $1200 in damages. Justice McLean
believed that the duty to obey the law overrode natural rights, his antislavery
views, and individual conscience. He charged the jury: "[I1n the course of
this discussion much has been said of the laws of nature, of conscience, and
the rights of conscience. This monitor, under great excitement, may
mislead,
94
law.
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violate
to
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Chase moved for a new trial, continuing his increasingly futile constitutional challenge to the fugitive slave law. Justice McLean again decided
against Chase. While he agreed with Chase's view of slavery and the presumption in Ohio that every person was free, Justice McLean's view of the
Constitution's compromise permitting slavery made him object to Chase's
natural law argument and his appeal to conscience. To Justice McLean, the
immorality of slavery was irrelevant, and he repeated his charge to the jury
stating: "The law is our only guide."95
Chase however remained undaunted and appealed to the United States
Supreme Court. Even Chase must have recognized that the chance of winning
Van Zandt's appeal in the Supreme Court was minuscule. The Court's 1842
Prigg decision rendered a constitutional attack on the Fugitive Slave Act
futile. 96 The only Supreme Court Justice with antislavery views was Justice
McLean, and he had already ruled against Chase. Although Justice McLean
had urged the Court to hear oral argument in the Van Zandt case, Chief Justice
Taney objected to hearing oral argument, for he thought the constitutional
question was already settled. Chief Justice Taney persuaded the rest of the
Court, except Justice McLean, and Chase was relegated to submitting only a
written brief, an ominous sign. Perhaps Chase subconsciously recognized that
he could not win, for his Van Zandt brief comes close to adopting a pure,
natural law theory. His brief straddled the fine line between "urging disregard
of positive law and urging incorporation of natural law within it."97 Chase's
argument was designed to test the limit of law, to put before the country and
the Court the conflict between humanity and prevailing law.
93.

41 U.S. (15 Pet.) 539 (1842).

94.
95.
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Jones v. Vanzandt, 13 F. Cas. 1040, 1045 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 7501).
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The brief opened by tacitly admitting that current legal precedent might
be against him. Chase argued, however, that such "authority may stand for
law," but does not always represent the law. Reason and truth "will ultimately
prevail."98 Chase noted that other well-established legal doctrines have been
overturned in time, and thus urged the Court to consider his arguments dispassionately and openly. Fifty pages of technical legal argument followed to
prove that Van Zandt could not be liable unless the slave owner actually
notified him that the persons he was transporting were fugitive slaves.
Chase's argument was logical, well-researched and persuasively argued; but
his interpretation of the law would have made it virtually impossible to
prosecute underground railroaders, which was a result neither the South nor
the Supreme Court was willing to countenance.
If the first part of Chase's argument was technically sound but clearly
judicially unattainable, the second half descended into utter futility. His argument that the Fugitive Slave Act was unconstitutional defied legal precedent
and current political reality. Yet, the brief brilliantly sets forth Chase's antislavery constitutional philosophy. Future Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner
considered Chase's Van Zandt brief to be the best he had ever read and borrowed Chase's arguments when he condemned the Fugitive Slave Act in the
Senate a few years later. "It is a triumph of freedom," said retired Justice Story
of Chase's argument, and accurately predicted that "his points will seriously
99
influence the public mind and perhaps the politics of the country."
And that was Chase's aim. As one biographer argues, Chase's point
"was simply to put before the country a solemn protest against making the
free States share in slavery."'" Chase reprinted the brief as a pamphlet and
widely distributed it to every member of Congress, as well as to other leading
politicians, irrespective of their views on slavery. The case attracted national
attention: Chase used the forum to publicize the antislavery cause. He had
astutely secured the prominent Governor of New York, William Henry
Seward, to act as co-counsel in the Supreme Court, in order to help the case
achieve national prominence. Seward's argument to the Court was also
published, in the New York Tribune.
Chase's argument, which eventually became the constitutional bedrock
of the Republican Party, was that the Constitution intended the U.S. government "to be kept free from all connection" with slavery, and to exclude slavery
SALMON PORTLAND CHASE, RECLAMATION OF FUGITIVES FROM SERVICE: AN
98.
ARGUMENT FOR THE DEFENDANT, SUBMITTED TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,

AT THE DECEMBER TERM, 1846, IN THE CASE OF WARTONJONES VS. JOHN VANZANDT 5 (1847).
HART, supra note 91, at 77.
99.

100.

Id.

500

52 UCLA LAW REVIEW 477 (2004)

from the territories!" l Slavery was a local institution, confined to the slave
holding states.
Chase drew on several key principles to support his constitutional position, and those principles were to undergird civil rights litigation throughout
the 19th century. First, he drew on the Declaration of Independence and other
extraconstitutional sources such as the Northwest Ordinance to inform his
view of the Constitution. To antislavery advocates like Chase, the Declaration's
self-evident truths were not "empty flourishes of rhetoric,"'' 2 but proof that
slavery was not constitutionally "to be fostered or sustained by national
authority."'0 " Chase believed that either the "Declaration of Independence
[is] a fable," or the Constitution must recognize all inhabitants of the U.S.
as persons with rights.' 4 Chase also relied on a rule of interpretation that the
Constitution must be interpreted consistently with natural, God-given rights,
and that slavery was a violation of a natural right. Reaching its highest rhetorical note, Chase's brief argued that
No Legislature can make right wrong; or wrong, right. No Legislature
can make light, darkness; or darkness, light. No Legislature can make
men, things; or things, men. Nor is any Legislature at liberty to
disregard the fundamental principles of rectitude and justice. Whether
restrained or not by constitutional provisions, there are acts beyond
any legitimate or binding legislative authority .... 105
The Court is obligated therefore to avoid interpreting the U.S. Constitution
in a manner, "which will bring its provisions into conflict with that other
CONSTITUTION, which, rising, in sublime majesty, over all human
06
enactments ... finds its 'seat in the bosom of God."
Chase's real plea in Van Zandt, as in many of his other cases, was not to
the Court but to the public and history. For Chase, the final arbiter in cases
of a "moral and political nature" is not the Court's judgment, but public
"opinion ... not of the American People only, but of the Civilized
World."'0 7
Antislavery lawyers like Chase, and their southern counterparts, understood that an appeal to the Constitution had the same kind of force on public
opinion as the equally common appeal to the Bible, and they therefore tried
to read into the Constitution self-evident, natural rights. As the son of one
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

CHASE, supra note 98, at 82.

Id. at 76.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 82-83.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 107.
Id.
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of Chase's friends later recounted, the appeal to fundamental rights, "however
little it might convince a court, was the most effective of all the antislavery
arguments, because it brought back the discussion to the absolute incongruity
of democracy and slavery, and emphasized both the question of moral right
''
and the social expediency of upholding the moral law." a
Nobody was surprised---except possibly Chase-when the Supreme
Court unanimously ruled against Van Zandt, holding the Fugitive Slave Act
constitutional despite its "supposed inexpediency and [the] invalidity of all
9
laws recognizing slavery or any right of property in man..'. But despite losing,
Chase wrote that he was "thankful" to have brought the case."' His arguments
were widely publicized, and he was "satisfied" with the public discussion the
case generated."' Abolitionists praised his arguments, and the respect he won
in Van Zandt and other fugitive slave cases helped Chase to be elected to the
U.S. Senate in 1849 and to the governorship of Ohio in 1855 and 1857.
Lincoln appointed him Secretary of the Treasury in 1861, and when Chase
could not contain his presidential ambition, and quietly tried to run against
Lincoln in 1864, Lincoln recognized his dedication and legal skills honed in
his fugitive slave litigation, and nominated him to be the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court.
The main long-term legacy of Chase and other fugitive slave litigators
was their contribution to a culture that encourages political movements to
use courts as vehicles of political protest. That litigation aided the rising tide
of Northern public opinion against slavery. As the prominent Wisconsin
newspaper editor Rufus King wrote in 1855, the judicial controversy over the

HART, supra note 91, at 72. Chase was one of the most effective antislavery constitu108.
tional advocates. He grounded his constitutional theory both in moral principle and practical politics.
One of his biographers notes that:
Hundreds of men on both sides liked to make the Constitution a partner in their speeches;
hardly any other rendered such services as Chase in defending the victims of slavery who
got across the line into the free States.... It was his courage as counsel in those cases, his
use of all possible legal technicalities and expedients in behalf of his client, and his fearless
and widely circulated speeches, which have made him best known as an anti-slavery man.
Id. at 73.
Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215,231 (1847).
109.
Letter from Salmon Portland Chase to Lewis Tappan (Mar. 18, 1847), reprinted in
110.
SCHUCKERS, supra note 91, at 65-66. Disappointed with the result, Chase recognized that the deck
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constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act "must provoke, everywhere,
1 12
discussion and agitation, and Liberty and Right must profit by these.
Chase was not the only antislavery advocate who used the courtroom
for political ends prior to the Civil War. Another group of abolitionists
waged a more utopian battle to constitutionally extinguish slavery everywhere in the United States. Like Chase, these abolitionists also read the
Constitution to conform to the Declaration of Independence and the natural right to freedom, but these abolitionists drew the much more radical
conclusion that the Constitution required the abolition of slavery both in
the North and in the South. They did so in the belief that Northern reverence
for the Constitution required the abolitionist movement to develop an
antislavery constitutional interpretation in order to gain adherents and spur
antislavery sentiment. However, like Chase and the more moderate antislavery movement, the utopian constitutionalists used test-case litigation as
one means of publicizing their constitutional doctrines.
In 1844, the utopian constitutionalists created an opportunity to litigate
their broad constitutional theories in court. That year, New Jersey ratified a
new constitution that included a declaration of rights providing that "All
men are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and
unalienable rights. .
Although the framers of the New Jersey
Constitution had ignored the continued, although dying existence of slavery
in that state, the New Jersey Anti-Slavery Society nevertheless resolved to
initiate a test case to "settle the question of the existence of slavery under the
new constitution."' 14 "[They genuinely hoped to win" in court, but the
abolitionists' primary
goal was "to focus the attention of an indifferent public
' 15
on their cause."
The New Jersey abolitionists realized that their constitutional challenge
to the remnants of slavery in New Jersey would be difficult, and their leader,
John Grimes, was openly dubious.' 6 Alvan Stewart, who argued the case for
the abolitionists, eschewed legal formalism in favor of a broad political-moral
argument. While he purported to be arguing a dry legal question,"7 his
argument reads like a political speech or religious sermon. In his request for
relief, he asked that the "[clourt set the nation the shining example of doing
112.
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114.
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right, on this question, by acting up to the full measure of their judicial and
moral power." 18

The New Jersey Supreme Court, by a 3-1 vote, rejected Stewart's
plea."9 The justices chose to follow the formalistic reasoning of the defense
counsel, Joseph Bradley.'20 According to one member of New Jersey's highest court, Stewart's arguments were "rather addressed to the feelings than to
the legal intelligence of the court.'' Only the antislavery Justice Joseph
Horblower dissented, and he did so without writing an opinion."
While losing in court, the New Jersey Slave Cases did accomplish the
abolitionists' aim of initiating a political debate on slavery, which culminated
in the New Jersey legislature's formal abolition of slavery in that state several
years later.'
Similarly, in Boston, black and white abolitionists waged a concerted
campaign in the 1840s to end segregation, which included litigation as one
component of the broader political effort. The litigation lost in court, but
helped place the issue of segregation on the legislative agenda. In 1841, a
number of black abolitionists, including Frederick Douglass, attempted to ride
4
the "white" cars of various segregated Massachusetts railroads.1 When physically removed, the abolitionists often sued; yet the lower courts ruled in favor
of the railroads. The abolitionists turned to the legislature, and the resulting
ALVAN STEWART, A LEGAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
118.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AT THE MAY TERM, 1845, AT TRENTON, FOR THE DELIVERANCE OF 4,000
PERSONS FROM BONDAGE (1845), reprinted in ABOLITIONISTS IN NORTHERN COURTS 441, 470

(Paul Finkelman ed., 1988).
See Ernst, supra note 114, at 356.
119.
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120.
Bradley's most famous civil rights decision was his opinion in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883), in which he articulated a formalistic reading of the Fourteenth Amendment to deny Congress
the power to prohibit segregation in public inns, accommodations, and transportation.
State v. Post, 20 N.J.L. 368, 369 (Sup. Ct. 1845).
121.
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122.
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pressure forced the railroads to voluntarily end segregated cars. 125 The Boston
abolitionist community then challenged school segregation. In the 1849 case
Roberts v. City of Boston,'26 the Massachusetts Supreme Court, in a unanimous
opinion written by the prominent antislavery Judge Lemuel Shaw, upheld
segregated schools in Massachusetts.'27 Yet, despite their loss in the courts, the
abolitionist community continued its political struggle, and, five years later,
the Massachusetts legislature outlawed segregation.
Likewise, New York City blacks in the 1850s formed the Legal Rights
Association and, represented by future President of the United States Chester
A. Arthur and other lawyers, staged a series of sit-ins against segregated
streetcars, losing in court but succeeding in pressuring a number of railroads
to end segregation.'28 In each of these cases, the litigation was brought not
merely to prevail in court, but as one method to spur debate in both the
public at large and in the legislature.
After the Civil War, African Americans continued this abolitionist
tradition, waging an impressive campaign in the courts against racial discrimination in schools. Between 1865 and 1903, more than seventy challenges to
discriminatory schools were litigated throughout the United States.'29 Blacks
overwhelmingly lost the cases that were decided on Fourteenth Amendment
grounds, although they were often successful on narrower state law claims.30
Moreover, even lawsuits that lost in court often led to legislative victories.
For example, New York blacks lost all six cases that they brought challenging
school segregation in the nineteenth century, but the judicial battle was a
springboard to victory in the local political arena; the state legislature
enacted legislation securing integration. Illustrative of the New York experience, Professor J. Morgan Kousser has written: "the failures of success and the
ultimate success that stemmed from those failures... all would be missed by
observers concerned only with the abstract principles embodied in printed
court opinions.''

125.
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The early women's movement also used the courts for the purposes of
political agitation. At an 1869 women's suffrage convention, a husband and
wife team of Missouri suffragists, Francis and Virginia Minor, argued that
instead of agitating for a new constitutional provision granting women the
right to vote, feminists should assert that women already had the constitutional
right to vote under the Fourteenth Amendment's privileges and immunities
clause. The Minors urged women to attempt to vote and, if prevented, to sue
the officials who had denied them that right. The Minors viewed litigation
as a means not only of vindicating rights, but also of educating the public.
Francis Minor urged that a test case be brought because, "in no other way could
our cause be more widely, and at the same time definitely brought before the
public. Every newspaper in the land would tell the story, every fireside would
hear the news. The question would be thoroughly discussed by thousands, who
now give it no thought... ,,132
Susan B. Anthony agreed with the Minors' radical new approach. She
and Elizabeth Cady Stanton printed the Minors' argument in their newspaper
33
and published 10,000 extra copies, sending it to all members of Congress.'
The National Women's Suffrage Association, led by Anthony and Stanton,
adopted the argument, and it became the cornerstone of the organization's
work for the next half decade.
The strategy urged by the Minors and accepted by the NWSA became
known as the New Departure Movement and represented a turn toward a
rights-conscious women's movement.13 1 Several test cases were brought by as
the New Departure Movement. The case that stirred the most political
debate and controversy was initiated when Susan B. Anthony convinced the
Republican poll inspectors to allow her to vote in the 1872 election.
Anthony and her comrades created an immediate sensation around the
country, earning both cheers and attacks. The New York Times boldly
declared that "[the act of Susan B. Anthony should have a place in history,"
and the Toledo Blade praised her for keeping "the public mind agitated upon

Letter from Francis Minor to The Revolution (Oct. 14, 1869), reprintedin 2 HISTORY OF
132.
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the women's rights question." Yet, the hometown Rochester Union and
35
Advertiser condemned her for "[flemale []awlessness."'
But, Susan B. Anthony saw voting as a mere precursor to the main
event. Encouraged by the response to her dramatic action, she hoped to launch a
test case on behalf of the registered women who had been turned away from
the polls. For Anthony, as for the abolitionists Chase and Stewart, litigation
was both a means to win concrete rights and an opportunity to convert the
courtroom into an arena for protest. She believed a courtroom battle would
provide a dramatic forum for publicizing the cause. To her friend, the feminist
leader Elizabeth Cady Stanton, she wrote about the exhilaration of casting a
vote in a national election, and her expectation of the ensuing litigation:
"[W]e are in for a fine agitation in Rochester on this question. '
Anthony could not have foreseen the course of events that was to result
in one of the great state trials of the nineteenth century. On Thanksgiving
Day, a federal marshal asked the women voters of Rochester to turn themselves
in to be prosecuted under an 1870 federal statute, grandly titled "An Act to
Enforce the Right of Citizens of the United States to Vote." Designed to prevent
former Confederates from voting illegally, and to prevent Ku Klux Klan intimidation of black voters, the statute had ensnared as its first victims a respectable
group of Northern housewives who had voted for the Republican ticket.
The women did not surrender. As Anthony reported, "[tjhe ladies refusing to respond to this polite invitation, Marshal Keeney made the circuit to
collect the rebellious forces."'37 For dramatic effect, Anthony even demanded
that the courteous and embarrassed marshal take her to jail in handcuffs.
Eventually, all the women voters and the three election inspectors who had
permitted them to vote were indicted. The stage was thus set for a courtroom
battle that would be even more dramatic than the test case Anthony had
originally hoped to bring.13
135.
See ALMA LUTz, SUSAN B. ANTHONY: REBEL, CRUSADER, HUMANITARIAN 200 (1959);
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After her indictment in December 1872, Anthony launched a broad
speaking campaign to educate the people of Rochester on the right of all
citizens to have equal access to the ballot. Over the course of the next several months, Anthony spoke in twenty-nine different post office districts in
the county, hoping "to make a verdict of 'guilty' impossible." '39 Her campaign
was obviously having an impact, for the district attorney's motion to change
the trial's venue to another county was granted by the court.
The change of venue did not stop Anthony's agitation. In the twentytwo days before the opening of the trial, Anthony made twenty-one speeches
in the new county to which the action had been transferred. Another
suffrage leader, Matilda Joslyn Gage, spoke in an additional sixteen townships.
Together they covered the entire county, taking the offensive and declaring
that "[tihe United States [is] on trial, not Susan B. Anthony."'" Anthony
publicized her argument that she had committed no crime, but simply
exercised her citizen's right to vote as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.
Anthony clearly was successful in generating nationwide publicity. Her
use of the pending court proceeding as a forum on women's suffrage set off a
lively debate in the press. The Syracuse Standard wrote that "Miss S. B.
Anthony... is conducting her case in a way that beats even lawyers," while
the New York Commercial Advertiser admired the "regular St. Anthony's
dance she leads the District Attorney ... in spite of winter cold or summer
heat, [Anthony] will carry her case from county to county precisely as fast as
the venue is changed. One must rise very early in the morning to get the
start of this active apostle of the sisterhood.... Other papers excoriated
Anthony's attempt to influence public opinion. A Rochester Union &
Advertiser letter from a reader was headlined, "Susan B. Anthony as a
Corruptionist," and the paper angrily declared that "United States Courts are
not stages for the enactment of comedy or farce."'42 The reader wrote that
Anthony was committing "a law offense known as embracery," defined as
"such practices as lead to affect the administration of justice, improperly
working upon the minds of jurors.""'
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Anthony's trial opened on June 18, 1873, before U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Ward Hunt.'" The packed courtroom included such notables as former President Millard Fillmore, Senator Charles Sedgwick, and former
Congressman E. G. Lapham.
Justice Hunt immediately made it clear that he was determined to
limit Anthony's use of the case for political protest. He refused to permit
Anthony to be a witness in her own behalf, ruling that she was incompetent, although he allowed the Assistant U.S. District Attorney to submit
hearsay evidence of Anthony's testimony at pretrial hearings.
Anthony's lead attorney was retired New York State Appellate Judge,
and former New York Lieutenant Governor, Henry Selden. After Selden's
three-hour argument and the district attorney's rebuttal, Judge Hunt read
his prepared opinion. Written before the trial had commenced, it stated that
Anthony had no right to vote under the Constitution and that any mistaken
belief she may have had about such a right did not excuse her criminal
action. As a matter of law, he directed the jury to find Anthony guilty and
then discharged the jury.
The court then fined Anthony $100 and the costs of the prosecution,
to which Anthony replied that she would not pay a penny and would
exhort women that "[riesistance to tyranny is obedience to God."'45 But
Anthony was not sent to prison for refusing to pay her fine. In an unusual
move for such a case, Justice Hunt said that he would not order Anthony
imprisoned until the fine was paid. As Anthony's lawyer John Van Voorhis
later commented, it was an adroit move, intended to deny Anthony the
ability to use a writ of habeas corpus to take her case directly to the Supreme
Court of the United States, where she would have had an excellent argument
that her right to trial by jury had been denied.'46 Anthony never paid the
fine, the government never proceeded to enforce the fine or to jail her, the
other women voters' cases were not prosecuted, and Anthony lost her
chance for Supreme Court review.
Anthony's case did, however, generate substantial public controversy.
Virtually every newspaper in the country reported and commented on the
trial, and several reprinted Anthony's arguments about women's right to vote.'47
144.
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More than one thousand dollars and scores of letters of support poured
in to Anthony after Hunt's verdict. She used most of the money to publish a
pamphlet containing a full report on the trial. Three thousand copies were
sent out to libraries and newspapers all over the country, and five thousand
copies of Selden's argument were also distributed.'48 The next year, one
newspaper called Anthony "America's best-known woman."'49 She had used
litigation successfully to protest women's inequality, speaking to thousands of
people about the case, engaging prominent figures in the dialogue about her
case including the president of the United States, and initiating debate in
legal journals, as well as in the popular press of the day.
Susan B. Anthony's case is now remembered as a noble, legitimate and
useful attempt to enlist the courts and country on behalf of women's right to
vote. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, reflecting on the significance of Anthony's case, stated: "[i]n another respect, Susan B. Anthony was
the clear victor. Her treatment at the hands of the judicial system won for
her the sympathy even of those who had been opposed to her original act."'50
Anthony was denied a jury trial precisely because she had successfully used
her case as a forum for public agitation and protest.
The New Departurists brought a number of other test cases, all of which
lost in court. The decisive loss came when the Supreme Court unanimously
ruled, in a case brought by the Minors, that the Constitution did not guarantee women the right to vote. 151 Despite their losses, the New Departurists
were not primarily "outcome-oriented" litigants, but rather activists who
believed that the real success of their strategy "must be measured in terms of
the amount and kind of publicity it was able to generate."'' 2
Civil liberties organizations in the first part of the twentieth century,
well before the highly publicized law reform movements of the 1950s and 60s,
also used litigation as a means for publicizing their cause. The Free Speech
League viewed the early 1900s free speech fights and the resulting court cases
as a means of publicizing its radical First Amendment views.'53 Even the
more conservative ACLU, despite Felix Frankfurter's early objections, used
New York Sun attacked Hunt for violating 'one of the most important provisions of the Constitution,"'
while "[tihe Utica Observer approved Hunt's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment but nonetheless condemned his seizure of jury power." Id. at 30.
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litigation in tandem with other means of publicizing its views. In the famous
Scopes case, involving the prosecution of a teacher for violating an antievolution statute, both the ACLU and its opponent, the World Christian
Fundamentals Association, perceived their major goal to be using the judicial
forum to influence popular opinion, not the jury.' 4 In the 1939 watershed case
of Hague v. CIO, 5' establishing the right to use public forums to publicize one's
views, one chronicler of the ACLU notes:
The ACLU did not simply run to the courthouse; it sent speakers like
Norman Thomas to Jersey City to protest the Hague regime's discrimination against labor organizers. It consciously sought out publicity in the
media, including more conservative establishment newspapers. It persuaded influentials like Walter Lippman and Dorothy Thompson to
speak out. And it solicited the assistance of organizations like the
only a single
CIO. While litigation was critical, it was nevertheless
156
element in a well-orchestrated campaign of resistance.
To summarize, these examples illustrate that throughout American
history, political movements and organizations have resorted to the courts, and
the federal courts in particular, not simply to win favorable court decisions,
but in order to publicize their views. Even when this litigation lost in court,
as in Chase's or Anthony's cases, the litigation often generated substantial
publicity and sympathy for the plaintiffs. Lawyers like Chase were viewed by
respected legal observers, such as Justice Story and Charles Sumner, as being
engaged in legitimate litigation and using appropriate strategies, and Chase's
legal work on behalf of fugitive slaves was an important qualification that
supported his appointment as Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
IL. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR USING COURTS AS
FORUMS FOR PROTEST
Protest movements' use of the courts as forums to express and publicize
their views is protected by the First Amendment. On many occasions, the
Supreme Court has proclaimed that litigation is a "form of political expression"
154.

See

EDWARD

J. LARSON,

CREATION AND EVOLUTION 63

TRIAL AND ERROR: THE AMERICAN CONTROVERSY OVER

(3d ed. 2003). The ACLU viewed the trial as an ideal chance to

promote public acceptance of academic freedom for evolutionary teaching and assembled a publicityconscious defense team, while the World's Christian Fundamentalist Association leaders viewed the
trial as "the greatest opportunity ever presented to educate the public and will accomplish more than
ten years' campaigning." Id. at 61, 62-63.

155.
156.

307 U.S. 496 (1939).

Robert L. Rabin, Lauryers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN.
L. REV. 207, 212 (1976).
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protected by the First Amendment. ' In 1972, the Court held that "[t]he
right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of
petition."'58 The Court has reiterated that "filing a complaint in court is a form
of petitioning activity," protected by the First Amendment. 9
The Supreme Court has also specifically noted the difference between
private litigation to resolve disputes and public interest lawsuits, which are
at the core of the First Amendment's protective ambit and are thus entitled to
greater protection. In NAACP v. Button,'6 for example, the Court noted that:
In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of
resolving private differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful
objectives of equality of treatment by all government, federal, state
and local, for the members of the Negro community in this country.
It is thus a form of political expression.... Resort to the courts to
seek vindication of constitutional rights is a different matter from the
oppressive, malicious, or avaricious use of the legal process for purely

private gain.161
The Button Court felt that "regulations which reflect hostility to stirring up
urge recourse to the courts
litigation have been aimed chiefly at those 6who
2
interest.'
public
no
serving
gain,
private
for
Justice Powell, writing for the Court in In re Primus,'63 also relied on
the distinction between public interest litigation and litigation undertaken
primarily for pecuniary gain in determining the constitutionally permissible
scope of a state's proscription of solicitation. The Court noted that:
[Primus'] actions were undertaken to express personal political beliefs
and to advance the civil-liberties objectives of the ACLU, rather
than to derive financial gain. The question presented in this case is
whether, in light of the values protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, these differences materially affect the scope of state
regulation of the conduct of lawyers.'6

157.
E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963).
158.
Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).
Prof l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus. Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 56 (1993);
159.
Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 896-97 (1984); McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 484
(1985); see also Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983).
160.
371 U.S. 415.
161.
Id. at 429, 443.
162.
Id. at 440.
163.
436 U.S. 412 (1978).
164.
Id. at 422.
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Justice Powell held that those differences were material.'65 He noted
that for the ACLU, like the NAACP, litigation is a form of political expression and political association. Most importantly, Justice Powell argued that
"[t]he ACLU engages in litigation as a vehicle for effective political expression and association, as well as a means of communicating useful information to the
public."'66 In Primus, as in Button, the Court recognized that litigation can be a
form of "cooperative, organizational activity,"'67 which is part of the "freedom
to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas"'68 protected
by the First Amendment.
The Court has also relied on the First Amendment to severely limit the
applicability of federal statutes to sanction litigation undertaken in "bad

faith." In ProfessionalReal Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries,
Inc.,169 the Court invoked the First Amendment right of petition to interpret
the Sherman Act as immunizing a litigant from antitrust liability even where
the litigant was motivated solely by an anticompetitive intent and not by an
expectation of a successful outcome to the litigation. Such litigation was
entitled to immunity unless it was also "objectively baseless in the sense that
no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits."'70
Moreover, subjectively "bad faith," anticompetitive litigation, presenting a
"novel" claim without any supporting authority, was nonetheless entitled to
antitrust immunity, "as long as a similarly situated reasonable litigant could
have perceived some likelihood of success."''

165.
The Court on other occasions has noted that the difference between public interest
litigation and litigation for pecuniary gain is significant in determining the constitutionality of bar
rules. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) (upholding the Florida Bar's thirty-day
restriction on attorney's direct mail solicitation of accident victims and their relatives). The
American Bar Association has also recognized that the rules for professional conduct cannot ignore
the differences between public interest and purely private litigation. In deciding that a National
Lawyers Committee opposed to New Deal legislation could, consistent with the rules of professional
ethics, offer counsel without fee or charge to anyone financially unable to retain counsel to challenge
such legislation, the ABA's Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances held that "[t]he
question presented, with its implications, involves problems of political, social and economic
character that have long since assumed the proportions of national issues, on one side or the other
which multitudes of patriotic citizens have aligned themselves. These issues transcend the range of
professional ethics." ABA Comm. on Profl Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 148 (Nov. 16, 1935).
166.
Primus, 436 U.S. at 431 (emphasis added).
167.
Id. at 438 n.32 (quoting Button, 371 U.S. at 430).
168.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,
460 (1958)).
169.
508 U.S. 49 (1993).
170.
Id. at 60.
171.
Id. at 65.

Courts as Forums for Protest

513

Similarly, in Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 7 ' the Court held
that First Amendment and federalism concerns prevented "a well-founded
lawsuit" from being "enjoined as an unfair labor practice, even if it would not
have been commenced but for the plaintiffs desire to retaliate against the
defendant for exercising rights protected by the [National Labor Relations
Act].0 73 "The right of access to a court is too important to be called an unfair
labor practice solely on the ground that what is sought in the court is to
enjoin employees from exercising a protected right." '74 The Court recognized
in Bill Johnson's Restaurants, as in Primus, that it is legitimate to petition the
judiciary not merely for compensation and the psychological benefits of
17 The Court
vindication, but also for the "public airing of disputed facts.""
only
relied on its antitrust jurisprudence to determine that the Board could
76
enjoin suits brought with a retaliatory motive that were also baseless.1
In its most recent holding, BE&K Construction Co. v. NLRB,'77 the
Court further articulated the protection the First Amendment affords litigation. There, the question was whether the NLRB may impose liability on an
employer for a retaliatory lawsuit that turned out to be unsuccessful. The
Court first suggested that baseless or frivolous lawsuits might not be completely unprotected by the First Amendment. Analogizing baseless litigation
to false statements, the majority noted that "[tihe First Amendment requires
that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters."''78
Baseless litigation may be protected "to ensure that 'the freedoms of speech
M,179
and press [receive] that "breathing space" essential to their fruitful exercise.
This protection is analogous to the protection articulated in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan"s that a public official seeking damages for defamation prove
"that false statements were made with knowledge or reckless disregard of their
falsity."'' 1 Justice O'Connor's majority opinion stated that these "breathing
space" principles were consistent with the Court's prior cases limiting regulation of litigation to "suits that were both objectively baseless and subjectively
motivated by an unlawful purpose."'82 Ultimately, the Court did not decide
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

461 U.S. 731 (1983).
Id. at 743.
Id. at 741 (quoting Peddie Buildings, 203 N.L.R.B. 265, 272 (1973)).
Id. at 743.
Id. at 744 (citing Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972)).
536 U.S. 516 (2002).
Id. at 531 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974)).
Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)) (alteration in original).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
BE&K Constr., 536 U.S. at 531 (citing New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279).
Id.
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the scope of First Amendment protection for frivolous litigation, since the
case involved the class of "reasonably based but unsuccessful lawsuits" that
had a retaliatory, antiunion motive.'
Justice O'Connor stated that the First Amendment protects all genuine
petitions and not merely those that are successful. The "genuineness of a
grievance does not turn on whether it succeeds."'" Equally important, the
Court articulated the First Amendment interests advanced by an unsuccessful
but reasonably based suit. "[U]nsuccessful suits allow the 'public airing of disputed facts'.., and raise matters of public concern. They also promote the
evolution of the law by supporting the development of legal theories that may
not gain acceptance the first time around."'85
Those values-public airing of disputes, raising issues of public concern,
promoting a community's own narrative of the law, which may not be
accepted by the state immediately but which is later adopted-are values not
usually associated with litigation. The Court in BE&K thus recognizes that
litigation has legitimate and important purposes apart from winning damages
or injunctive relief in court.
Despite its broad invocation of First Amendment values and principles,
the Court's actual holding was quite narrow. The Court avoided deciding the
difficult constitutional issue of the extent to which the First Amendment
protects reasonable, but unsuccessful litigation brought with a retaliatory
purpose, by adopting a limiting construction of the relevant National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) provision. Nor did the Court decide whether the
NLRB could sanction an unsuccessful but reasonably based lawsuit that was
filed solely to impose the costs of the litigation process. Finally, the Court
specifically included the caveat that "nothing in our holding today should be
read to question the validity of common litigation sanctions imposed by
courts themselves-such as those authorized under Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure."'86
Taken individually, each of these cases invoking the First Amendment
to determine the permissible scope of state or congressional regulation of
litigation may stand for relatively narrow propositions. But as a whole, these
cases have profound implications for the role of litigation that seeks not only
or even primarily to obtain a favorable reply from the government official
petitioned-whether it be an executive official or judge-but rather to

183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id. at 532.
Id. (quoting Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983)).
Id. at 537.
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provoke public debate and discourse on the subject of the petition. Notwithstanding Justice O'Connor's caveat concerning Rule 11 and other litigation
sanctions imposed by courts, the BE&K opinion appears to call into constitutional question the use of sanctions against lawyers such as Ramsey Clark or
Bill Kunstler for bringing litigation to educate the public about important issues.
A.

Sanctions and the First Amendment

The use of courts as forums to spark political protest and debate
throughout American history, and the Supreme Court's more recent explicit
recognition of the First Amendment values and protections of litigation,
support the legitimacy of litigation brought to achieve these purposes. Courts
must analyze Rule 11 and other similar state court sanctions in light of the
First Amendment protection afforded litigation. Yet many court decisions,
including a recent Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling, pay no heed to First
on attorneys.181
Amendment principles when imposing sanctions
Rule 11 (b)(1) provides that a litigant or lawyer can be sanctioned where
a case or motion is brought "for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation."' Rule
11 (b)(2) requires the attorney to certify that the claim or defense or other
legal contention is not baseless in that it is "warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law or the establishment of new law."' 9 The requirement that a lawsuit or
motion not be presented for an improper purpose raises two First Amendment
questions. The first is what is an improper purpose; more specifically, is a
Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 332 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc). In
187.
Whitehead, the plaintiffs won a $3.4 million judgment. Three days after the defendant's post-trial
motions were denied, the plaintiffs attorney obtained a writ of execution for the judgment and
notified the media. The defendant claimed that a stay of execution of judgment was in effect, but
the en banc court of appeals assumed that the plaintiffs attorney had an objectively reasonable belief
that no stay was in effect and therefore did not violate subpart (b)(2) of Rule 11. The court found
that subpart (b)(1) provided an independent basis for sanctions because the plaintiffs attorney had
requested the writ for the improper purpose of embarrassing and harassing the defendant and to gain
publicity for himself. The critical evidence of the attorney's improper purpose was a media event he
orchestrated. Id. at 807. The court of appeals summarily rejected the sanctioned attorney's First
Amendment arguments because (1) he raised it for the first time on appeal and (2) the media event
was not itself sanctionable but was only evidence of the attorney's improper purpose to embarrass the
defendant. Id. at 807-08. But the Court in BE&K Construction held the First Amendment
considerations require that the NLRA be read as not permitting sanctions for nonfrivolous actions
that a court finds were undertaken with an improper purpose-a holding that the Whitehead court
simply ignored in its Rule 11 analysis.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1).
188.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).
189.
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lawsuit that has as either a purpose or primary purpose obtaining publicity
for a plaintiffs cause improper? Second, can a lawsuit that is nonfrivolous
nonetheless be sanctioned because it was brought in whole or in part for
political purposes? The questions are important because, as the social science research explored at the beginning of this Article demonstrates, many
public interest cases, whether successful or unsuccessful, are brought with
an aim of seeking favorable publicity for a plaintiffs cause. Yet Rule 11 can
be read to render such litigation illegitimate and sanctionable.
The authority of judges to sanction attorneys who present frivolous
claims, or bring nonfrivolous claims for what a court terms an improper
motive, or seek publicity for their clients or causes, is the power to determine that certain legal arguments or strategies are illegitimate and to use
the state's power to stifle and curtail their articulation and development.
During the past two decades, public interest attorneys such as prominent
civil rights advocates Ramsey Clark and Bill Kunstler have been sanctioned
for what courts termed frivolous claims or improper motives. In other cases,
defendants have sought sanctions in an effort to chill litigation, as occurred
in the litigation challenging the U.S. policies towards Haitians fleeing persecution in that country. In that case, the government responded to the
plaintiffs' lawsuit by moving to impose Rule 11 sanctions against the plaintiffs' lawyers for bringing a frivolous lawsuit.'90 That motion was obviously
an attempt to chill the lawyers, and it gave them "considerable concern,"
although it became moot when the district court granted the plaintiffs the
relief they sought.'9 ' Many lawyers were so chilled in the 1980s and early
1990s: A 1980s American Judicature Society study found that almost onethird of lawyers representing civil rights plaintiffs reported that they had
declined to present a claim they believed to be meritorious."' Vhile the
1993 Amendments to Rule 11 have significantly ameliorated the problem,
190.
See Victoria Clawson et al., Essay, Litigating as Law Students: An Inside Look at Haitian
Centers Council, 103 YALE L.J. 2337, 2343 (1994); Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; Mockery of
Justice, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1992, at A29. One aspect of the litigation, alleging that the INS
screening procedures did not adequately protect the Haitians' statutory and treaty rights to apply for
refugee status was eventually decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc.,
509 U.S. 155 (1993).
191.
Harold Hongju Koh, The Human Face of the Haitian Interdiction Program, 33 VA. J.
INT'L L. 483, 485 (1993).
192.
See Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 Nw. U. L.REV. 943,
971 (1992) (citing an American Judicature Society study that found that lawyers who spent most
of their time representing plaintiffs in civil rights suits were "far more likely to be affected by Rule
11 than other lawyers"); see also Margaret L. Sanner & Carl Tobias, Recent Work of the Civil Rules
Committee, 52 MONT. L. REV. 307, 313 (1991). But see Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision of Federal
Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J. 171 (1994).

Courts as Forums for Protest

5171

the text of Rule 11 and its interpretation by some courts still may create a
chilling effect on public interest litigation. Moreover, Congress continues to
debate an increase in the authority of judges to sanction litigation deemed
frivolous or otherwise improper.9
1.

Publicity as an Improper Purpose

The courts have divided on whether a litigant who files an action or a
motion seeking publicity has an improper purpose under Rule 11 (b) (1). The
Second and the Ninth Circuits have held that seeking publicity is not an
1
improper purpose-at least for claims that are nonfrivolous. ' The Second
Circuit recently overturned a district court's imposition of sanctions against
litigants who had brought an action with the purpose of obtaining publicity
to put pressure on defendants:
The district court held that the filing of the complaint with a view
to exerting pressure on defendants through the generation of adverse
and economically disadvantageous publicity reflected an improper purpose. To the extent that a complaint is not held to lack foundation in law
or fact, we disagree. It is not the role of Rule 11 to safeguard a defendant
from public criticism that may result from the assertion of nonfrivolous
claims. Further, unless such measures are needed to protect the integrity
of the judicial system or a criminal defendant's right to -a fair trial, a
for, speaking to
court's steps to deter attorneys from, or to punish them
9 5
implications.
Amendment
the press have serious First

Similarly, the Ninth Circuit rejected sanctions against plaintiffs whose
motives were arguably to delay and defeat a recall attempt against a city
councilman rather than merely obtaining the specific voting rights sought in
the complaint. 96 The court held that such a political purpose would not be
improper under the Rule.'97 "mhe political inspiration for the federal lawsuit
does not necessarily mean that the action is 'improper' within the meaning of
Rule 11. Much of the redistricting litigation under the Equal Protection
9
Clause has been inspired by those with a transparent political interest."'
For example, the House of Representatives recently enacted legislation designed to increase
193.
the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. Marcia Coyle, Congress Takes Up Rule 11 Sanctions, NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 20, 2004, at 1; Carl Hulse, Bill to Require Sanctions on Lauryers Passes House, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
15, 2004, at A20.
Sussman v. Bank of Isr., 56 F.3d 450, 459 (2d Cit. 1995); Zaldivar v. City of Los
194.
Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 834 (9th Cit. 1986).
Sussman, 56 F.3d at 459.
195.
Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 831.
196.
Id.
197.
Id.
198.
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Other courts, however, disagree with the holdings of the Second and
Ninth Circuits. The Fifth Circuit has recently held that an attorney can be
sanctioned because he had an improper purpose of embarrassing his adversary
by obtaining adverse publicity.' That the attorney "orchestrated" a media
event was strong evidence of his improper purpose that was sanctionable
even if the action the attorney took was not frivolous. Some district courts
have also concluded that plaintiffs seeking publicity by filing a reasonable
complaint constitutes an improper purpose. 2°° Moreover, the Fourth Circuit
suggested in Kunsder that holding a press conference and seeking publicity
was an improper purpose if that was the plaintiffs central or primary purpose
in filing the complaint." '
These cases illustrate the confusion surrounding the definition of an
improper purpose. Litigation that has the purpose of sparking public debate
or promoting greater public awareness of an issue, or obtaining publicity to
put pressure on a defendant, should not be viewed as improper. Nor can
the filing of complaints or motions through press conferences be viewed as
either in "poor taste" or evidence of improper purpose; public interest lawyers
who file pro bono litigation frequently announce their suits in press conferences for the purpose of drawing broad public attention to their grievances.
This type of litigation falls within the core First Amendment protection
articulated by the Court in Button, Primus and BE&K, and cannot be sanctioned simply because the petition is directed at the public and not only at
the court.
2.

Sanctioning Nonfrivolous Lawsuits That Have an Improper Purpose

The circuit courts are split on the issue of whether a finding of any
improper motive alone is sufficient for the court to award sanctions. The text
and history of Rule 11 suggest that any improper motive is sanctionable. 3 A
199.
Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 332 F.3d 796, 802 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
200.
Bryant v. Brooklyn Barbeque Corp., 130 F.R.D. 665, 670 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
201.
In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 520 (4th Cit. 1990) (emphasis added). Kunstler and some
other cases suggesting that seeking publicity constitutes an improper purpose (but not the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Whitehead) occurred in the context of cases the court also found to be frivolous.
Therefore those cases are not necessarily inconsistent with the Second and Ninth Circuit's finding
that seeking publicity or some other political goal does not constitute an improper purpose in the
context of nonfrivolous litigation.
202.
See Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU et al. at 6, Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S.
1030 (1991) (No. 89-1836); see also supra note 48.
203.
The text of Rule 11 permits sanctioning a pleading filed for any improper purpose and the
committee that drafted the 1983 version rejected an attempt to insert the word "primarily" into the
Rule to qualify the improper purpose clause. See supra note 75.
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number of circuits, however, have departed from the text of Rule 11(b)(1)
complaint, even if
and will not sanction a plaintiff for filing a nonfrivolous
the plaintiff2s purpose is improper.104 The Seventh Circuit, on the other
hand, has repeatedly ruled that sanctions are appropriate where a party has
20 5
filed a nonfrivolous complaint for an improper purpose, and the Fifth
Circuit has recently followed that approach." 6 Other circuits, in dictum,
have suggested that an improper purpose alone can support Rule 11 sanctions
even where a complaint is nonfrivolous."' A number of district courts have
sanctioned plaintiffs based solely on a finding of improper purpose independent of an analysis of whether the complaint was nonfrivolousrs
It seems inconsistent that the First Amendment right of access to
Article III courts requires that the federal antitrust statute be read to allow
regulation only of suits that are both objectively baseless and subjectively
motivated by an unlawful purpose, yet Rule 11 can sanction lawsuits that are
either objectively baseless or undertaken with an improper purpose. Justice
O'Connor suggests that sanctions imposed on litigants by the courts
themselves are different than sanctions created by federal law. However, it is
unclear why the First Amendment should afford less protection against

E.g., Sussman v. Bank of Isr., 56 F.3d 450, 458-59 (2d Cit. 1995); Townsend v. Holman
204.
Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc); Burkhart v. Kinsley Bank, 852
F.2d 512, 515 (10th Cir. 1988); Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Employees, Inc. v. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed.
Employees, 844 F.2d 216, 223-24 (5th Cit. 1988) (adopting Ninth Circuit rule distinguishing filing a
complaint from filing subsequent papers in applying improper purpose clause of Rule 11); see also
Barbara Comninos Kruzansky, Note, Sanctions for Nonfrivolous Complaints? Sussman v. Bank of Israel
and Implications for the Improper Purpose Prong of Rule f1, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1359 (1998).
E.g., Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C & 0 Enters., Inc., 886 F.2d 1485, 1491 (7th Cit. 1989); Mars
205.
Steel Corp. v. Cont'l Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928 (7th Cit. 1989) (en banc); Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v.
Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cit. 1987).
Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 332 F.3d 796 (5th Cit. 2003) (en banc).
206.
For example, when Justice Breyer sat on the First Circuit, he joined an opinion stating
207.
that Rule 11 has been read "to reach groundless but 'sincere' pleadings, as well as those which, while
not devoid of all merit, were filed for some malign purpose." Lancellotti v. Fay, 909 F.2d 15, 18-19
(1st Cit. 1990). The Third and Eleventh Circuits have also suggested that sanctions are appropriate
for a complaint filed with improper purpose alone. See CTC Imports & Exports v. Nigerian
Petroleum Corp., 951 F.2d 573, 578 (3d Cit. 1991); see also Didie v. Howes, 988 F.2d 1097, 1104
(11th Cit. 1993) (Rule 11 requires sanctions for filing of a frivolous pleading or "a pleading in bad
faith for an improper purpose"). See generally Andrews, supra note 19, at 30-31 nn.122-25.
In Ballentine v. Taco Bell Corp., 135 F.R.D. 117, 122 (E.D.N.C. 1991), the district court
208.
imposed sanctions even though the plaintiff had made a reasonable inquiry and had a legitimate
purpose of seeking relief, Rule 11 sanctions were warranted solely because his improper purpose of
harassing defendant outweighed the proper one. In Bryant v. Brooklyn Barbeque Corp., 130 F.R.D.
665, 670 (W.D. Mo. 1990), the court found that the plaintiff had not made a proper factual
inquiry, but even had a reasonable basis existed for the filing of the complaint would still have
imposed sanctions because the complaint was filed solely for publicity and harassment.
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judicially imposed sanctions," 9 since both antitrust and Rule 11 sanctions
may only be imposed by a court after it concludes that a lawsuit is "improper."
Certainly the legislature's interest in preventing anticompetitive or antiunion
lawsuits is as important, if not stronger, than the judiciary's interest in
preventing frivolous or otherwise improper litigation.
3.

Frivolous Claims

The Rule 11 requirement that a litigant certify that his or her claims are
warranted by existing law, or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification or reversal of existing law, or the establishment of new law, is
equally problematic. Ironically, the replacement of the old subjective, bad
faith test with an objective reasonableness test has made the amended Rule
11 much more unpredictable." l Empirical research conducted by the Federal
Judicial Center found that when judges were presented with a number of
hypothetical cases, they most often divided almost equally as to whether a
case was legally frivolous.21 ' Experience in actual litigation is consistent with
the Center's research. District court and appellate judges have been unable
to agree on whether a case is frivolous. Circuit courts have held that claims
that district court judges sanctioned as frivolous were not merely reasonable
but winning,2"2 and held that claims district courts judges upheld were legally
frivolous."' Supreme Court Justices and circuit court panels have found a
209.
Cf. Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (imposing Rule
11 sanctions on plaintiffs counsel where case "was brought as a public statement of protest" with no
chance of legal success).
210.
See Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced Approach to "Frivolous" Litigation: A Critical
Review of FederalRule 11 and State Sanctions Provisions, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1067, 1081 (1994); Linda
Ross Meyer, When Reasonable Minds Differ, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1467, 1483-84 (1996).
211.
SAUL M. KASSIN, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11
SANCTIONS 17 (1985).

212.
E.g., Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 444 (9th Cir. 1995); Locomotor USA, Inc.
v. Korus Co., No. 93-56032, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 401, at *23-*24 (9th Cir. Jan. 6, 1995); In re
Edmonds, 924 F.2d 176, 181-82 (10th Cir. 1991); Cooper v. City of Greenwood, 904 F.2d 302 (5th
Cit. 1990); Operating Eng'rs Pension Trust v. A-C Co., 859 F.2d 1336, 1343-44 (9th Cir. 1988);
Trident Ctr. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 570 (9th Cir. 1988); Stevens v. Lawyers Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co., 789 F.2d 1056, 1059 (4th Cir. 1986); Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1070-71
(2d Cir. 1985).
213.
E.g., Dilley v. United States, No. 93-4225, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 4480, at *5 (10th Cir.
Mar. 6, 1995); Oil & Gas Futures, Inc. v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 287, 288 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Sanford
Levinson, Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything at All?, 24 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353,
370-71 (1986) (commenting on the circuit court's opinion that the plaintiffs argument was "quite
incredible," but that the district court had apparently accepted it and the circuit had to reverse him);
Meyer, supra note 210, at 1484 & n.48 (the court agreed with sanctions argument, but found the
controversy to be moot).
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claim to be so frivolous that no reasonable litigant could believe it meritorireasonable brethren
ous, even though strong opinions by their presumably
claim. 14
valid
a
stated
had
litigant
the
that
find
Most commentators concur that despite Rule lI's attempt to create an
"objective" standard of frivolous litigation, courts have been unable to
develop a principled line for determining whether a complaint is so baseless
as to be frivolous.1 Indeed, some scholars have argued that the definition of
21
frivolous is fundamentally indeterminate, or as Professor Sanford Levinson
has put it: "[it is, I suspect, no coincidence that writers on frivolousness have
tended to adopt versions of Justice Stewart's famous (or is the correct word
'notorious'?) test of pornography, that is '[Plerhaps I could never succeed in
21 7
...[blut I know it when I see it.'
intelligently [defining it]
Indeterminate or vague legal standards chill speech, and that has been
the effect on public interest lawyers asserting novel or cutting-edge claims.
The vagueness or indeterminacy of the test for frivolousness is evident in
cases where a court imposes sanctions upon a finding that "the case offered
no hope whatsoever of success."2 But the "no chance of success" standard
For example, in Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980), the Court reversed a dismissal of a
214.
prisoner's petition and the lower court's award of attorney's fees against the prisoner. Justice
Rehnquist dissented, arguing that the prisoner's claim was totally meritless and therefore the "award
of attorney's fees was entirely proper." Id. at 23 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As Mark Tushnet wrote,
"[It seems that, in Justice Rehnquist's view, a claim can be 'meritless' even though six members of
the Supreme Court found that it stated a claim on which relief could be granted." Letter from Mark
Tushnet to Sanford Levinson (June 13, 1986), quoted in Levinson, supra note 213, at 377; see also
Hyde v. Van Wormer, 474 U.S. 992, 993 (1985) (damages awarded for frivolous petition for
certiorari where three Justices believed petition was not frivolous); Tatum v. Regents of Univ. of
Neb.-Lincoln, 462 U.S. 1117 (1983) (same); Gullo v. McGill, 462 U.S. 1101 (1983) (three Justices
would have awarded damages for frivolous appeal); cases cited in Meyer, supra note 210.
See Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L.
215.
REV. 259, 287-90 (1995); George Cochran, Rule 11: The Road to Amendment, 61 MiSS. L.J. 5, 8-9
(1991); Keeling, supra note 210; Levinson, supra note 213, at 370; Meyer, supra note 210; Melissa
L. Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Looking for a Middle Ground on Rule 11
Sanctions, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 383, 384 (1990); William W. Schwarzer, Rule II Revisited, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1013, 1016-17 (1988); Charles M. Shaffer, Jr., Rule 11: Bright Light, Dim Future, 7 REV.
LITIG. 1, 11 (1987) ("No matter what words are used as the objective yardstick, the application of
the Rule to different facts by different judges inevitably will yield inconsistent results.").
See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 210.
216.
Levinson, supra note 213, at 370; see also Robert Hermann, Frivolous Criminal Appeals, 47
217.
N.Y.U. L. REV. 701, 705 (1972) ("Frivolousness, like madness and obscenity, is more readily
recognized than cogently defined."); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Report of the Special Committee to Consider
3, 12 (1990) ("The
Sanctions for Frivolous Litigation in New York State Courts, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
circularity of the [objective test's] definition, however, inevitably leads to and invites subjective
decisionmaking.").
Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam); see also BE&K
218.
Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002); Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures
Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993) (articulating that test). One commentator asserts that the
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inherently mixes law and politics indeterminately, forcing attorneys to decide
whether an argument is legally reasonable based on whether anybody
believes, in the contemporary political environment, that any court would
adopt it. This suggests that the frequent litigation brought by black litigants
in the early 1900s attacking Plessy v. Ferguson" 9 would have been sanctionable since surely any "reasonable" observer would agree that there was no
chance of success whatsoever.
Northwestern Law School Professor Anthony D'Amato has argued that
the Libyan plaintiffs in Saltany had a legitimate legal argument that the
bombing of Libya by the United States and Great Britain constituted a war
crime that should not be accorded immunity under the Nuremberg precedent
established by the United States after World War ll."'0 The reason that a
reasonable observer could determine that the Saltany litigation was hopeless
was not because of the unreasonableness or frivolousness of the plaintiffs'
legal argument. Rather, it was the political and legal reality that U.S. courts
have refused to apply the Nuremberg precedent, and more generally international law norms, against U.S. officials in U.S. courts. Similarly, Salmon
Chase should not have been sanctioned for appealing the Van Zandt case to
the Supreme Court, and the Women's Suffrage Movement should not have
been sanctioned for continuing the Minor litigation in the Supreme Court,
despite the certainty in both cases that they would lose." Both cases presented arguable legal theories that resonated with a substantial sector of the
American public, if not with the contemporary court to which they argued.
The 1993 Amendments to Rule 11 sought to blunt the criticism that
the threat of sanctions had discouraged novel litigation.2 The Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules made clear the broad latitude to be given novel
legal claims, stating that courts should consider whether the litigant "has
support for its theories even in minority opinions, in law review articles, or
'
through consultation with other attorneys."223
Similarly, some courts have
discarded the approach that looks at the objective frivolousness of plaintiffs'

test of "absolutely no chance of success" is the "prevailing approach" of many courts to frivolousness.
Schwarzer, supra note 215, at 1015-16.
219.
163 U.S. 537 (1896); see also Gladys Tignor Peterson, The Present Status of the Negro
Separate School as Defined by Court Decisions, 4 J. NEGRO EDUc. 351 (1935).
220.
D'Amato, supra note 10.
221.
See supraPart II.
222.
The Advisory Committee found support for the criticism of the rule that "it occasionally
has created problems for a party which seeks to assert novel legal contentions." Tobias, supra note
192, at 180 (citing Advisory Committee Report).
223.
FED. R. Cv. P. 11 advisory committee notes, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 583, 586-87 (1992).
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claims in favor of an approach that analyzes whether the attorney's research
and preparation of the litigation or motion was objectively reasonable. 4
Read properly, the Rule immunizes litigators who bring reasonably
researched and thought-out claims on issues of public importance. That is
because a colorable argument can be constructed for virtually any proposition.21
As one commentator has noted, "it is extremely difficult in practice, if not
impossible in principle, to devise an 'extension, modification or reversal'
exception that does not devour the 'unwarranted by existing law' rule.22 6
Remarkably, many court decisions have not even recognized the applicability of the First Amendment in the Rule 11 context. For example the
court of appeals' decision in Saltany never mentioned the First Amendment
when it held that sanctions were required because federal courts do not properly
"serve as a forum for 'protests.'22 7
The determination of whether a claim is objectively frivolous requires a
recognition that the First Amendment protects lawyers who make losing
arguments about real harms and important values in order to promote public
dialogue. The First Amendment requires some protection or "breathing
space" for frivolous lawsuits, particularly those that reflect the core First
Amendment value of presenting important issues of public concern, just as
the First Amendment precludes public officials from recovering damages for
defamation unless they can prove actual malice. 8 For a court to sanction a
legal argument as "objectively frivolous" is to determine that it is beyond the
pale, beyond discussion in the courtroom. 9 But the law, like truth, is not
static, and arguments that in one era have been deemed frivolous or unreasonable have been adopted as the law by later generations. The recognition
of the ever-changing nature of the law requires that the remedy for a legal
petition deemed "frivolous" is to respond to it, not sanction it.
As a New York Bar Association Committee eloquently stated:
Access to the court system is a basic tenet of the American legal
and historical tradition. A sanctions provision which exerts a chilling
influence on creative counsel does violence to this tradition. The
sanction of dismissal or the denial of relief by the court is a sufficient
224.
See Meyer, supra note 210, at 1487-91; see, e.g., Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont'l Bank N.A.,
880 F.2d 928, 932-33 (7th Cit. 1989) (en banc); see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S.
384, 401-02 (1990) (suggesting that key inquiry isreasonableness of investigation).
225.
See Joseph William Singer, The Playerand the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE
L.J. 1, 22-23 (1984).
226.
Atkinson, supra note 215, at 288.
227.
Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438, 440 (D.C. Cit. 1989) (per curiam).
228.
BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516,531 (2002).
229.
Meyer, supra note 210, at 1492.
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safeguard. Indeed, in our common law tradition, it is bad public policy

to provide judges with a tool that would permit them not only to
dismiss an action, but also to sanction
the losers when in their view
230
the claims or theories were frivolous.

B.

The Appropriate Role of Lawyers in the Court of Public Opinion:
Sanctions for Attorneys' Speech

A model that views litigation as a forum for educating the public also
raises questions as to the appropriate role of lawyers as advocates outside the
courtroom. "That a lawyer should not argue her case outside the courtroom"
has long been articulated by some as a basic obligation of the legal profession. 3 ' That view ignores the long tradition in American law recounted
above, of prominent lawyers arguing important law reform cases not merely in
the courts of law, but in the court of public opinion.
The explosion in the media's attention to the law, particularly in such
high-profile, high-publicity trials as the murder trial of Sam Sheppard in the
1960s and the O.J. Simpson trial in the 1990s, has sparked a vigorous debate
over the circumstances in which a lawyer may engage in extrajudicial
advocacy. Some courts, commentators and leaders of the Bar have urged that
a lawyer's proper function is to "present his case in the courtroom, not... to
build a favorable climate of public opinion," and would permit rules narrowly
limiting the circumstances in which a lawyer may present his or her client's
case to the public.232 Other judges and commentators conclude that an
attorney's advocacy for his client outside the courtroom is both legitimate
and strongly protected by the First Amendment. They would strictly limit the
restrictions the Bar and judiciary may place on such speech as those necessary

230.
N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, supra note 217, at 8-9. The committee recommended a standard
that would impose sanctions only for abusive conduct, not frivolous claims. Id. at 9. It defined
abusive conduct as conduct "undertaken or omitted primarily to delay or prolong unreasonably the
resolution of the litigation or to harass or maliciously injure another." Id. at 12. That recommendation has not been adopted by the New York courts.
231.
Jonathan M. Moses, Note, Legal Spin Control: Ethics and Advocacy in the Court of Public
Opinion, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1811 (1995); see, e.g., CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 20 (1908),
reprinted in AM. BAR ASS'N, SELECTED STATUTES, RULES AND STANDARDS ON THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 237 (1990) ("Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation
may interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice.
Generally they are to be condemned.").
232.
AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 65, at 92; see also Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton,
31 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 1994); State v. Van Duyne, 204 A.2d 841, 852 (N.J. 1964).
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to protect against a clear and present danger to the administration of
justice.233
Rule 3.6 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted in
1983 and amended in 1994, attempts to weave a compromise between the
competing views, yet is significantly more protective of lawyers' speech than
the rules contained in the older Model Code of Professional Responsibility.34
While the Model Code sees little public value in attorneys' extrajudicial
speech, the commentary to the Model Rules recognizes that "there are vital
social interests served by the free dissemination of information about events
'
having legal consequences and about the legal proceedings themselves."235
Both lawyers' use of the media and restrictions on lawyers' speech have
become increasingly common in the last few decades. 36 The battle has
become particularly intense over restrictions on criminal defense attorneys'
speech in the context of an ongoing or pending criminal trial. In Gentile v.
State Bar,237 the Supreme Court narrowly divided 5-4 on the First Amendment
standard to be applied to attorney speech. The majority upheld a Nevada
Supreme Court Rule that was based on Model Rule 3.6, which prohibited a
lawyer from making "an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would
expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. 2 38 The Court held that the
First Amendment did not require the state to meet a "clear and present danger"
standard before disciplining an attorney for public pronouncements about a
pending criminal trial, but permitted such discipline upon a lesser showing of
"substantial likelihood of material prejudice.""
29

233.
See AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 65; Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242,
249 (7th Cir. 1975); see also Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1035 (1991) (Kennedy, J.);
Chemerinsky, supra note 59, at 881-84 (arguing that current rules and gag orders limiting attorneys'
speech fail strict scrutiny); Joel H. Swift, Model Rule 3.6: An Unconstitutional Regulation of Defense
Attorney Trial Publicity, 64 B.U. L. REV. 1003 (1984).
For example, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility stated that it is the duty of a
234.
lawyer not to release information or opinion "if there is a reasonable likelihood that such dissemination
would interfere with a fair trial," MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1988), while
the newer Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct provide that the lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial
statement if it "will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding," MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 (2004).
235.
Compare MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-33 (1988), with MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. 1 (1994).
236.
See Chemerinsky, supra note 59, at 859-60; Moses, supra note 231.
237.
501 U.S. 1030.
238.
Id. at 1060 (quoting NEV. SUP. CT. R. 177(1) (1999)).
239.
Id. at 1070-76.
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The Court balanced the general First Amendment interests in information
about criminal trials against "the basic premise of our legal system... that
lawsuits should be tried in court, not in the media."2" Writing for four
Justices, Justice Kennedy would have applied the First Amendment "clear
and present danger" test to state prohibitions on attorney speech, and not the
more deferential balancing test of the majority. Justice Kennedy rejected the
state's argument that attorney contact with the press during the pendency of
a trial somehow "is inimical to the attorney's proper role," and pointed out
that the State's disciplinary rules did not posit any inconsistency between an
"
' Moreover, Justice Kennedy
attorney's role and discussions with the press.24
necessity
in some circumstances of
recognized the legitimacy, value, and even
attorneys' commentary to the press because attorneys hold "unique qualifications
as a source of information about pending cases," and in some circumstances, an
attorney's "press comment is necessary to protect the rights of the client and
'
prevent abuse of the courts."242

Despite the majority's view that a lawyer's speech about pending cases
can be regulated under a less demanding First Amendment standard, the
Court nonetheless reversed the state's discipline of the lawyer for his comments to the press. A majority of the Court, including Justice O'Connor,
who had joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion on the First Amendment
standard to be used, found the safe harbor provision of the Disciplinary
Rule, as interpreted by the Nevada Supreme Court, void for vagueness.
Attorney Gentile had carefully researched the rule and had attempted to
comply with its safe harbor immunity for a lawyer to "state without elaboration
the general nature of the... defense." ' In its vagueness determination, the
Court held that the First Amendment required the state to regulate lawyers'
speech clearly enough to avoid the suppression of speech critical of those who
enforce the law, a requirement particularly relevant to the regulation of "the
criminal defense bar, which has the professional mission to challenge actions
of the state." In a sense, the Court's vagueness holding in Gentile is similar to
court opinions in the Rule 11 arena that would not sanction well researched
complaints because they meet the standard of objective reasonableness,
even if a court might find that the claims they presented had no chance of
success.

244

1080 n.6 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
1056 (Kennedy, J.).
1056, 1058.
1061 (quoting NEV. SUP. CT. R. 177(3)(a) (1991)).

240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

244.

Id. at 1051; cf. Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont'l Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928,932-33 (7th Cir. 1989).
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The Supreme Court's Gentile decision thus reflects the deep division
within the Bar about the legitimacy of, and protection to be afforded, attorney speech. While Gentile and most other attorney speech cases occur in
the context of a criminal case, Model Rule 3.6 at issue in Gentile is also
applicable to civil cases, 245 and there have been attempts to sanction or gag
attorneys or litigants in conjunction with public interest civil litigation
such as environmental litigation.246
Sanctions have generally been rejected in the civil litigation context.
Attorneys who bring and speak publicly about civil litigation with the purpose of furthering public education and public debate are protected by the
First Amendment and not subject to sanction under the Rules of Professional
Conduct. The civil litigation problem presents an analytically different
balancing than the tension described by the Model Rules and cases such as
Gentile. The Model Rules and other state rules are premised on a balance of
the Sixth Amendment interests in the fair administration of justice versus the
First Amendment interests of the lawyers and public in speech directed at, or
likely to influence, juries. But frequently, particularly in the litigation model
described in this Article, attorney publicity is not directed at the court at all.
Rather, it is aimed at influencing nonjudicial actors, general public opinion,
executive officials, defendants, or industry officials.247 This type of speech
simply does not raise the same type of concerns that speech by lawyers aimed
at helping their clients win a jury verdict does.
More fundamentally, the increasing recognition of the role of litigation
in furthering public debate and shaping public opinion requires that lawyers
be accorded the strongest First Amendment protection in commenting on
245.
Rule 3.6 speaks of prejudice to any adjudicative proceeding, including civil trials. However,
the commentary makes clear that the nature of the proceeding is relevant to a determination of
prejudice, with a prejudicial effect of a statement much less likely in civil and non-jury trials. The
older Model Code specifically precluded a lawyer from making an extrajudicial statement that would
be disseminated relating "to [h]is opinion as to the merits of the claims or defenses of a party, [or
a]ny other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial ....
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107(G) (1988).
246.
See Colo. Sup. Ct. Grievance Comm. v. Dist. Ct., 850 P.2d 150 (Colo. 1993) (attorney
for an environmental group was investigated by the Colorado Office of Disciplinary Counsel in
connection with the attorney's speaking at a press conference about a lawsuit the group had filed and
his giving interviews to the press); Jennifer L. Johnson, Empowerment Lawyering: The Role of Trial
Publicity in Environmental Justice, 23 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 567, 590-93 (1996) (describing the
Colorado case: the attorney was not sanctioned and the Colorado rule was changed to make it more
difficult to sanction attorneys); see also Bailey v. Sys. Innovation, Inc., 852 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1988);
Ruggieri v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 503 F. Supp. 1036 (D.R.I. 1980) (sanctions sought for
attorneys' extrajudicial comments concerning asbestos litigation); Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Profl Ethics
& Conduct v. Visser, 629 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 2001).
247.
See Moses, supra note 231, at 1834-41.
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civil litigation. In the 1975 case of Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 4s

the Seventh Circuit held the Model Code's Disciplinary Rule governing
lawyers' extrajudicial statements in civil trials unconstitutional. The court
noted numerous differences between civil and criminal cases with respect to
the likelihood of lawyers' extrajudicial speech prejudicing the trial. The
court also found the "nature of certain civil litigation" important:
As plaintiffs indicate, in our present society many important social
issues became entangled to some degree in civil litigation. Indeed,
certain civil suits may be instigated for the very purpose of gaining
information for the public. Often actions are brought on behalf of the
public interest on a private attorney general theory. Civil litigation in
general often exposes the need for governmental action or correction.
Such revelations should not be kept from the public. Yet it is normally
only the attorney who will have this knowledge or realize its
significance ....Therefore, we should be extremely skeptical about
any rule that silences that voice.249
The Fourth Circuit and other courts have been unanimous in reaching the
same conclusion. 50
Advocacy in the court of public opinion has become a norm of the legal
profession."' Many high-powered criminal defense and civil litigators engage
in what one attorney calls "political litigation," in which they rely on a public
relations strategy to protect their clients' interests. 2" As one commentator
notes, "for a public figure, the real concern from the legal action may not be
the legal result but the press coverage." '53 The Bar's reaction to Gentile was to
further amend the professional rules to ensure that lawyers' speech would not
be chilled.2 4 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion discounting the need for
248.
522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975).
249.
Id. at 258 (emphasis added).
250.
See, e.g., Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356,373 (4th Cir. 1979). The court stated:
Civil actions may also involve questions of public concern such as the safety of a particular
stretch of highway, the need of the government to exercise its power of eminent domain, or
the means of racially integrating schools and colleges. The lawyers involved in such cases
can often enlighten public debate.
Id.; see Wachsman v. Disciplinary Counsel, No. C-2-90-335, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20899, at *29
(S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 1991); Ruggieri, 503 F. Supp. at 1038-39; see also Bailey, 852 F.2d 93 (vacating
order that applied local rule restricting defendants in a civil case from commenting).
251.
See Moses, supra note 231, at 1830.
252.
This comment was made by Leonard Garment, a high-powered Washington lawyer. Id.
at 1838 n.148 (quoting -Susanne A. Roschwalb & Richard A. Stack, Litigation Public Relations,
COMM. & L., Dec. 19 9 2 , at 3, 12).
253.
Id. at 1833.
254.
For example, in 1994, the Model Rules were significantly amended to permit more
attorney speech. See Catherine Cupp Thiesen, Comment, The New Model Rule 3.6: An Old Pair of
Shoes, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 837, 838-39 (1996) (asserting the new Rule to be an improvement);
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extrajudicial advocacy has been strongly criticized by commentators for
failing to recognize the realities of modern practice .
These developments suggest that a model that views as an important
function of litigation the education of the public on matters of important
social concern has gained legitimacy in recent decades. Judicial acceptance
of this function should lead to a recognition that lawyers' extrajudicial speech
in both civil and criminal matters is legitimate and must be governed by the
strict First Amendment "clear and present danger" test and not by some lesser
standard. A lawyer's speech on pending litigation performs an important
social and political function protected by the First Amendment, and only
when it can be demonstrated that there is some serious and imminent threat
to the fair administration of justice should that speech be constrained.
IV. THE COURTS AS FORUMS FOR PROTEST AND THE TENSION
BETWEEN THE ARTICULATION OF NORMS AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT
One important difference between the courts as forums for protest model
and the public law litigation model set forth by Abrams Chayes is the
diminished role that judicial relief plays in the former. The judicial role
required by the courts under the forums for protest model is often significantly less intrusive than that presented by the institutional or structural law
reform model. While the centerpiece of the institutional law reform model
Comm. on ProflI Responsibility, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., The Need for Fair Trials Does
Not Justify a DisciplinaryRule That Broadly Restricts an Attorney's Speech, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 881
(1993) (calling for a rule that applies only a short time before trial). A number of states tried to protect
the ability of lawyers to speak to the press without fear of discipline. See Esther Berkowitz-Caballero,
Note, In the Aftermath of Gentile: Reconsidering the Efficacy of Trial Publicity Rules, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV.
494, 501 (1993). Colorado changed its rule from "substantially likely" to "likely to create a grave
danger of imminent and substantial harm." See ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, TRIAL PUBLICITY 181 (1994) [hereinafter ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL]. Illinois,
North Dakota and Oregon also adopted language requiring imminent harm. See id.; see also Alberto
Bernabe-Riefkohl, Silence isGolden: The New Illinois Rules on Attorney ExtrajudicialSpeech, 33 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 323, 347-48 (2002). California, in adopting its first trial publicity rule, set a "clear and
present danger" test. Id. at 325 n.1 1,326, 348.
255.
See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 59, at 872; Berkowitz-Caballero, supra note 254, at
499; L. Cooper Campbell, Note, Gentile v. State Bar and Model Rule 3.6: Overly Broad Restrictions
on Attorney Speech and Pretrial Publicity, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 583, 588 (1993); Lynn S. Fulstone,
Casenote, Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada: Trial in the "Court of Public Opinion" and Coping With
Model Rule 3.6-Where Do We Go From Here?, 37 VILL. L. REV. 619, 621-22 (1992); Michael W.
McTigue, Jr., Case Comment, Court Got Your Tongue? Limitations on Attorney Speech in the Name of
Federalism:Gentile v. State Bar, 72 B.U. L. REV. 657, 668-71 (1992); Lester Porter, Jr., Note, Leaving
Your Free Speech Rights at the Bar-Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991), 67 WASH. L. REV.
733, 744-46 (1992); Andrew Blum, Left Speechless, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 18, 1993, at 1; Monroe
Freedman, Silencing Defense Lawyers, LEGAL TIMES, May 6, 1991, at 22.

530

52 UCLA LAW REVIEW 477 (2004)

was the decree that attempts to restructure or change institutions, judges can
and do utilize a variety of much less assertive mechanisms to aid litigants who
seek to utilize courts as forums for protest.
The judiciary's intervention in restructuring or supervising institutions
such as schools, prisons, or mental hospitals has been one focus of the scholarly and legislative criticism regarding or surrounding law reform litigation.
Indeed, Professor Fiss claimed that the core dilemma of structural reforn
litigation was the tension between the "declaration" of a norm and its "actualization" in a decree.256 Plaintiffs' use of courts as forums to further public
debate and dialogue presents relatively unexplored and underutilized alternatives for judges grappling with that dilemma.
There is an inherent dialectic tension between the court's roles of creating legal meaning and exercising its power.257 I define the creation of legal
meaning to be the court's articulation of norms, within the context of
particular narratives or stories that give those norms context and texture.
Conversely, the court exercises its power by ordering or failing to order those
brought before it to do something.
These dual functions of the judiciary are both distinct yet inextricably
connected. Normally the court creates constitutional meaning and articulates constitutional principle in the context of exercising its power to either
grant or deny relief, whether it be in the form of an equitable decree or an
award of damages. There are, however, judicial decisions where the connection
between the court's dual functions are radically separated: A court may issue
an order with no rationales articulating its reasoning, or a court may abstractly
articulate norms with no interest in ever enforcing them. Between these two
poles lies a multitude of gradations.
Plaintiffs who use courts to further a public dialogue or political
movement draw the legal system directly into the political arena, and by
doing so strain the connection between the articulation of meaning and the
exercise of power. These cases lend themselves to the possibility of a court
articulating a constitutional principle, but refusing to act on that principle in
the particular case before it. The court would do so to further the plaintiffs'
goal of increasing the public's understanding of the constitutional principles
involved, to lend its weight and prestige to the public dialogue on the
256.
Fiss, supra note 3, at 53; see also Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization
Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1053-56 (2004) (describing
tension between rights and remedies in public law litigation).
257.
Constitutional theorists have often described the tension to which I refer between
meaning and power as one between rights and remedies. See, e.g., Fiss, supranote 3, at 52-53; Daryl
L.J. Levinson, Rights Essentialismand Remedial Equilibration,99 COLUM. L. REv. 857, 861-74 (1999).
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constitutional values at issue, and to put pressure on executive officials or
other defendants to comply with its constitutional vision. Yet, at the same
time the court would yield to a complex assortment of political, social,
ethical, practical and legal conditions and refuse to order the defendant to
comply with the constitutional principle the court invokes.
I admit that articulating and exploring this potential schizophrenic or
dialectical judicial role in cases wherein the court's jurisdiction has been
invoked at least in part as a forum for protest leaves me deeply troubled and
conflicted. It raises a host of practical and theoretical questions that go to the
heart of our most basic constitutional doctrines about the role and function of
Article III courts and the role of judges more generally. Does this judicial
mechanism allow judges to avoid their own struggle between the myriad of
social, psychological, ideological and jurisprudential factors that are involved
in making difficult decisions such as whether to allow the government to
execute a prisoner, initiate a war, or prohibit gay marriage? If used more
often, will it provide judges with a justification to avoid confronting the
government's unconstitutional actions? Does it constitute an advisory opinion,
something forbidden by two centuries of judicial "case or controversy" doctrine?
Will it lead to judicial denunciation of government action in principle while
permitting such action in practice, which as Professor Laurence Tribe has
noted is inconsistent with "an Anglo-American legal system that has long
insisted that law be composed of enforceable norms" and "seems to teach
mostly hypocrisy.""2 8
Illustrative of the conflict I feel in proposing this judicial role as a
"teacher to the citizenry," is that one of its most articulate and eloquent expositions came from Alexander Bickel, who argued that the Court must
recognize the "passive virtues" of refusing to decide certain cases. For Bickel,
Even when it is ultimately constrained to yield to necessity, howeverto yield, this is to say, to the judgment of the political institutions-the
Court can exert immense influence. It may be unable to wield its ulti-

mate power as an organ of government charged with translating
principle into positive law; but it need not abandon its concomitant
role of "teacher to the citizenry." The power to which Marshall
successfully laid claim is not the full measure of the Court's authority
in our day. And the Court's arguments need not be compulsory in
order to be compelling. Many of the devices of not doing engage the

Court, as I have shown, in colloquies with the political institutions ....

258.
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But the Court ... can see to it that the political judgment of necessity
is undertaken with awareness of the principle on which it impinges. 59
A court's use of the political question doctrine and similar prudential
and jurisdictional devices to avoid reaching difficult constitutional questions
is a device that should be minimized, and not affirmed. Cases presenting
deeply felt protests against important government or corporate policies often
present courts with difficult dilemmas and choices between the demands for
justice and the judges' perceived limitations on their role, function or ability
to confront that injustice. These cases require a court to carefully negotiate
the ever-changing fault line between what the law is and ought to be, and
not retreat behind formalistic or other jurisprudential rationales to avoid
seriously grappling with the moral and legal issues the cases present.
Yet often the cultural, legal, and political milieu of a judge makes such
an approach difficult, if not impossible, for a judge freighted with the baggage
of his or her era. As Robert Cover discussed in his book Justice Accused,
prominent antislavery judges felt constrained by their era's jurisprudential
tools, or what he termed their "juristic competence," which severely limited
their range of responses to the moral dilemmas presented by slavery."W Judges,
such as John McLean, when confronted by ideological advocates like Salmon
Chase, who challenged the dissonance between their antislavery ideology and
their judicial support for a system that returned runaway slaves to their
owners, sought refuge in a set of mainly formalistic rationales.
While Cover's study is a careful analysis of the specific historical, cultural, and legal environment facing these judges, it obviously has broader
implications. Cover's study itself stemmed from an analogy he had made
between judicial complicity in slavery and judicial acquiescence in the crimes
of the Vietnam War.
The twentieth century witnessed many similar judicial articulations of
powerlessness when confronted by claims of injustice: the Supreme Court's
affirmance of the internment of Japanese Americans during World War
1I,261 the Court's refusal to decide the legality of sending American soldiers
to kill and be killed in Vietnam,2 62 and the Court's formalistic disposition of
259.
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 187-88 (1962) (citation omitted).
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Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
262.
See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 386 U.S. 972 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari to 369 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1966)); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972),
affd sub nom.nwithout opinion, Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973); Rodric B. Schoen, A
Strange Silence: Vietnam and the Supreme Court, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 275 (1994); Warren F. Schwartz
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26 3
Winnebago County,
challenges to injustice in such cases as DeShaney v.
265
McClesky v. Kemp,264 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, or
6 Nor has judicial deference to, and acquiescence in, the
Harris v. McRae."
unjust assertion of power by the political branches been confined to judges
who articulate positivist, formalist jurisprudence; judicial deference has also
plagued judges steeped in legal realism, such as Justice Felix Frankfurter. The
perceived need to defer to power overwhelmed even those Supreme Court
Justices, such as Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, who normally fought
against narrow, mechanistic legal perspectives, when they were confronted
with a great intractable national issue such as Vietnam.
In Justice Accused and other works, Cover suggested some approaches
262
that judges could apply to the dilemmas faced by the antislavery judges.
Similarly, Professor Richard Abel's study of South African judges' responses
to litigation challenging aspects of the South African apartheid system
illustrates that even in time of great repression, in which a nation's legal
structure supported an unjust social structure, judges do have choices and
can creatively and flexibly work within the fissures and contradictions of
68
the legal system to undermine, and not prop up, the unjust regime. Might
one such creative and flexible solution to the dilemmas judges face lie in a
court's use of whatever fissure exists between its power to order compliance
with rules, and its authority to set forth the principles upon which the government and private organizations ought to act? When is it appropriate for
a court to speak truth to power, yet not directly confront power with its
own power? Can a court sidestep a direct confrontation with authority, but
nonetheless broadcast its message to the public and the government?
A case that illustrates the potential usefulness and pitfalls of this
approach is Dellums v. Bush. 269 That case involved a challenge by fifty-four
& Wayne McCormack, The Justiciability of Legal Objections to the American Military Effort in

Vietnam, 46 TEX. L.REV. 1033, 1036-37 (1968).
489 U.S. 189 (1989).
263.
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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411 U.S. 1 (1973).
265.
448 U.S. 297 (1980).
266.
For example, in Justice Accused, Cover argued:
267.
[Iin a dynamic model, law is always becoming. And the judge has a legitimate role in
determining what it is that the law will become. The flux in law means also that the law's
content is frequently unclear. [This frequent lack of clarity makes possible "ameriolist"
solutions. The judge may introduce his own sense of what "ought to be" interstically, where
no "hard" law yet exists. And, he may do so without committing the law to broad doctrinal
advances ....
COVER, supra note 82, at 6.
RICHARD ABEL, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS (1995).
268.
752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
269.
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Democratic members of Congress to enjoin President George H.W. Bush
from waging war against Iraq in order to expel Iraq from Kuwait without the
congressional authorization required by Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of
the Constitution.270 The lawsuit was filed by Congressman Ron Dellums and
the other Congressional Representatives because they believed such a war
would violate the Constitution, and thought that a court might agree. But
win or lose, they were sure the lawsuit would shake people up and provide
an opportunity to educate the public. Congressman Dellums later recounted
his conversations with members of Congress who were unsure whether they
wished to join the lawsuit as plaintiffs: "I told them even if we don't win in
court, maybe we'll win in the courtrooms and living rooms of America,
where this case will eventually be tried. 27'
The case was assigned to Judge Harold Greene of the District Court of
the District of Columbia. The son of a German-Jewish jeweler, Greene
escaped from the Nazis with his family in 1939 and came to the United
States. After the war and his service in Army Intelligence, Greene attended
law school and joined the Justice Department. A strong advocate of civil
rights, his most lasting contribution at the Justice Department was his role in
drafting the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Appointed to the federal bench in 1978 by President Carter, Greene was
considered an excellent judge-smart, fair and in control of the courtroom.
A month after his appointment to the federal bench, Greene was
assigned his first, and probably most important case, United States v. AT&T."
For the next six years, Greene presided over litigation that led in the end to
the breakup of the AT&T monopoly over the telephone industry. He masterfully handled the complex case, which some antitrust experts thought was
too difficult for any single court, rising to the challenge and dominating the
courtroom. Greene was undaunted by a big political case and unlikely to
slavishly defer to the government.
The pressures and tensions Judge Greene faced in the Dellums case
were enormous. At oral argument, Judge Greene was clearly troubled by his
inclination that the formal law-the Constitution's text and the framers'
intent-strongly supported the plaintiffs' position that the Executive did not
have the unilateral power to initiate a major armed conflict, which under any
plausible definition was a war. As a judge and strong advocate of fidelity to
the Constitution, Judge Greene clearly did not want to evade his obligations
270.
271.
272.

The author was the lead counsel for plaintiffs in Dellums.
Interview with Congressman Ronald V. Dellums, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 1996).
461 F. Supp. 1314 (D.D.C. 1978).
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to enforce what he viewed as a clear constitutional provision. "What I am
interested in finding out," Judge Greene calmly asked the Justice Department
attorney arguing the case, "is whether a clause in the Constitution, not some
blank space in the Constitution or some interpretation but an actual clause in
the Constitution, can be273enforced, or is it simply up to the President either to
ignore it or abide by it?
Despite Judge Greene's apparent view that the Executive's position was
inconsistent with the Constitution's command, the practical, political and
constitutional realities must have pressed on him. The case was argued
against a backdrop of a deeply divided Congress, and nation where neither
the congressional Democratic leadership nor the President was willing to call
a special session to vote on authorization for war. The U.N. Security Council
had voted 12-2, with China abstaining, to authorize the United States and its
allies to use "all necessary means," a euphemism for force, to expel Iraq from
Kuwait.274 Less than a week before the argument, President Bush dropped a
diplomatic bombshell. At a news conference, the President announced that
he had invited Iraq's foreign minister to Washington, and offered to send
Secretary of State Baker to Baghdad "to reach a peaceful solution" to the
Persian Gulf crisis.275 While Congressman Dellums and other observers saw
the diplomatic maneuverings as mostly show, a judge would be reluctant to
issue an injunction while diplomatic efforts were under way. A judge would
have to consider whether the issuance of an injunction would stiffen the
resolve of Iraq's Saddam Hussein and lead to the breakdown of negotiations.
Any judge deciding the case would shoulder a heavy burden.
Moreover, Judge Greene must have felt some conflict as to the underlying substantive policy to be followed toward Iraq. Judge Greene, while liberal
in domestic affairs, was, according to a former law clerk who knew him well,
an admirer of former Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson's hawkish views on
foreign policy.
Most important was the reality that judges have been virtually unanimous in refusing to interfere with U.S. military operations. At oral argument,
Judge Greene demonstrated an awareness of that reality when he asked
whether any court at any point in American history had ever enjoined

Hearing Transcript at 14 (Dec. 4, 1990), Dellums (No. 90-2866 (HHG)). Portions of the
273.
Transcript are reprinted in THOMAS M. FRANCK & MICHAEL J.GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS
AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 667-73 (2d ed. 1993).
U.N.S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 1-2, 27-28, U.N. Doc.
274.
S/RES/678 (1990).
The MacNeillLehrer News Hour (PBS Television Broadcast, Nov. 30, 1990).
275.
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United States military action. 76 The answer is no, with one exception; that
of Judge Orrin G. Judd who enjoined the U.S. bombing of Cambodia in
1973.277 That injunction was stayed within hours by the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, which eventually reversed Judd's decision a few months later.278
A similar decision by Judge Greene in the Dellums case would certainly
have suffered the same fate. Moreover, he no doubt worried about its effect
on the ongoing drama then unfolding in the Middle East.
Judge Greene came up with a creative solution. His decision, announced
a month before the deadline set by the U.N. for Iraq to withdraw from
Kuwait, rejected the government's constitutional arguments and most of its
jurisdictional and prudential arguments.
Judge Greene decisively rejected the Justice Department's political
question defense, stating:
If the Executive had the sole power to determine that any particular
offensive military operation, no matter how vast, does not constitute
war-making but only an offensive military attack, the congressional
power to declare war will be at the mercy of a semantic decision by the
Executive. Such an "interpretation" would evade the plain language of
the Constitution, and it cannot stand.279
Judge Greene held that a U.S. assault on Iraq would be war, within the
meaning of Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, and announced that "the Court is
not prepared to read out of the Constitution the clause granting to the
Congress, and to it alone, the authority to 'declare war."' S He went on to
hold that the plaintiffs had standing, that the court had the equitable power
to grant relief, and concluded that a court could, in principle, issue an injunction at the request of members of Congress to prevent the conduct of a war
that was about to be launched without congressional authorization.
Nonetheless, Judge Greene held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to
injunctive relief because the controversy was not ripe. He found that the
President was not so clearly committed to military action against Iraq to
make the case ripe for injunctive relief. More importantly, Judge Greene said
that the judicial branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of
power between the president and Congress if only a minority of Congress
seeks relief. Only where a majority of Congress has disapproved a president's
276.
Hearing Transcript at 5 (Dec. 4, 1990), Dellums (No. 90-2866 (HGG)).
277.
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d
Cir. 1973).
278.
484 F.2d 1307.
279.
Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1145.
280.
Id. at 1146.
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claim to use force does a ripe controversy exist, for only then are the president
and Congress in such deadlocked conflict that a court should intervene.
Judge Greene did not dismiss the case; he only denied plaintiffs' motion
for a preliminary injunction. He seemed to invite congressional action disapproving President Bush's move to war and stated that, should Congress take
such action, the plaintiffs could come back to court.
Both sides claimed victory. On Nightline, Dellums praised Judge Greene's
rejection of the Justice Department's sweeping war powers claims."' Yet, the
government correctly pointed out that technically Judge Greene's decision
imposed no limit on the President's prerogatives. "The bottom line," said the
Justice Department attorney Stuart Gerson, "is we won.""'

The academic community reacted positively to Judge Greene's decision.
Harold Koh, the author of a brief filed on behalf of the plaintiffs by a group of
prominent law professors, termed the decision an "unappealable declaratory
2 ' John Hart Ely, a signer of that brief,
judgment against the government.""
wrote an essay entitled "Two Cheers For Judge Greene.""
The media could not declare a clear winner in the Dellums case, juxtaposing headlines like "Judge Finds Bush Can't Go to War Alone" with subtitles,
in smaller type, reading "But Says It's Premature to Order President to Get
Congressional OK."2 s The Los Angeles Times reversed the captions, starting
with "U.S. Judge Refuses to Block Bush From Starting a War" and then adding
286
'
"But He Also Says Only Congress Can Authorize an Attack on Iraq." The
New York Times noted that while Judge Greene had rejected the legislators'
request for an injunction, "his ruling was also a significant rejection of the
Bush Administration's position that it need do nothing more than consult
'
with Congress before going to war."287
For Ron Dellums, however, the lawsuit was a clear success. He focused
on the political climate the case helped to create. Dellums was "convinced
Nightline: Persian Gulf Peace/War See-Saw (ABC Television broadcast, Dec. 14, 1990).
281.
For other news commentary on Greene's rejection of the Justice Department's war powers claims,
see Ethan Bronner, Judge Turns Back Bid to Force Bush to Consult Congress Before Attack, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 14, 1990, at 17; and David G. Savage & Michael Ross, U.S. Judge Refuses to Block
Bush From Startinga War, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1990, at A22.
Harry Stoffer, Judge Finds Bush Can't Go to War Alone, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 14,
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that the main reason Bush eventually came to Congress was because of our
lawsuit. The lawsuit brought our struggle front and center, brought the
Constitution front and center, and brought the Persian Gulf buildup front
and center." Judge Greene's holding that "the Court is not prepared to read
Congress' war powers out of the Constitution" gave us momentum to force
Bush to come to Congress. "Everyone felt buoyed by the decision." The
congressman's aide, Lee Halterman, felt that a "sea change" took place in
Congress after Judge Greene's opinion was announced. While Dellums had
not stopped the war, Bush was forced to come to Congress, and Congress, as
required by the Constitution, debated and voted on whether to go to war.
' The
And for Dellums, "[t]hat was a victory."288
main purpose in bringing the
lawsuit had been to spur political action. Thus, from that perspective, Judge
Greene had written a masterful decision, probably the best he could have
rendered.
Judge Greene had told the president that he couldn't go to war alone.
But his decision also took Congress to task for avoiding its responsibility and
for contributing to the constitutional crisis through its refusal to vote on
President Bush's war. In effect, Judge Greene was telling Congress to show
some backbone of its own if it wanted him to enjoin the president. The whole
decision put political and legal heat on both Congress and the president to
act, and the fact that Judge Greene had not dismissed the case meant that if
Congress did show some courage and voted to stop President Bush, the
plaintiffs could be back in court. Dellums decided not to appeal the district
court decision.
I remain troubled and conflicted by Judge Greene's approach. Certainly
his approach was preferable to that of District Court Judge Royce Lamberth,
who heard a soldier's objection to the pending Persian Gulf War at the same
time and who broadly dismissed his claim as presenting a nonjusticiable
political question.289 Moreover, had Judge Greene enjoined the president
from going to war without congressional authorization, his decision would
have certainly been appealed and undoubtedly reversed. But that might have
been preferable. Such an injunction certainly would have raised the constitutional issue to the foreground of the public debate, and in a manner
where the meaning of the Executive's constitutional violation was clearer. It
would have placed the court's money where its mouth was, and the court's
commitment to its constitutional ruling would have been apparent. Perhaps the
best answer is that the acceptability of Judge Greene's approach is dependent
288.
289.
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on the factual circumstances confronting the court. Given the circumstances Judge Greene faced, I cannot say, in hindsight, that he reached a
bad result.
Judge Greene's approach in Dellums has a long pedigree in American
history. Certainly the most famous and celebrated use of this technique was
utilized by Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Marbury v. Madison29
where he first held that the Jefferson Administration had unconstitutionally
deprived Marbury of his judicial commission and that the Court could remedy
that violation by issuing a mandamus against high Executive officials. Only then
did the Court determine that it was without the jurisdiction to do so because
the statute providing such jurisdiction was unconstitutional. President Jefferson
firmly believed that the Court's discussion of Marbury's right to a commission
and the propriety of a court-issued mandamus against cabinet officials was
obiter dissertation, 9' and it was this part of the opinion that provoked the
greatest attack by Republicans.2 92 Indeed, it was Chief Justice Marshall's dicta
condemning President Jefferson's actions, and not his assertion of the principle
of judicial review of legislative acts, that received the most press attention at
the time. 93 Chief Justice Marshall certainly intended to send the message
that the President was acting unlawfully, at the very time he was avoiding a
direct confrontation with the political branches. His opinion has aptly been
termed "a masterwork of indirection, a brilliant example of Chief Justice
Marshall's capacity to sidestep danger while seeming to court it, to advance in
one direction while his opponents are looking in another."2' 94 Like Judge
Greene's opinion, Chief Justice Marshall's tactical brilliance in Marbury lay
at least in part in his taking advantage of the always potential tension between
the Court's role in creating meaning and its function of exercising power.9
These are other examples where courts articulate the Constitution's
meaning while declining to exercise judicial power. While the initial
290.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
291.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), reprintedin 15
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292.
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Vietnam War cases simply dismissed soldier or citizen complaints as posing
broad political questions or on other jurisdictional grounds, as the war dragged
on, a few courts, such as the D.C. Circuit, spoke out clearly against the constitutionality of the war, while still dismissing the lawsuit. In MitcheU v. Laird,296
the respected jurists Judge Wyzanski and Chief Judge Bazelon held the Vietnam
War to be unconstitutional, despite congressional funding for the war, writing
"this court cannot be unmindful of what every schoolboy knows: that in voting
to appropriate money or to draft men a congressman is not necessarily approving of the continuation of a war no matter how specifically the appropriation
'
The court nonetheless refused to enjoin the
or draft act refers to that war."297
continuing war, holding that the question of whether President Nixon was
proceeding in good faith to promptly end that unconstitutional war was a
nonjusticiable political question. The court's statement of what "every schoolboy knows," was shortly thereafter written into the War Powers Resolution
when Congress enacted that law over President Nixon's veto later in 1973.' 9'
Courts have also, at times, introduced changes in legal doctrines by
articulating legal limitations without granting the relief sought by the particular party before the court. 2" Similarly, the Supreme Court has in a variety
of different contexts recognized the validity and necessity of ignoring the
general rule that a court should avoid deciding difficult constitutional questions when the decision can rest on alternative grounds, and instead encouraged lower courts to decide a constitutional issue that may even be irrelevant
to the disposition of a case in order to instruct the citizenry and public officials
as to the Constitution's meaning.)° Another situation that contains traces of
the same approach is what my colleague Arthur Hellman terms "oppositive

488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cit. 1973).
296.
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dictum," where a court denies relief, but states that under301 a different set of
circumstances, it might, or would, reach a different result.
There are a multitude of mechanisms a court can use to indicate support
for a legal norm to the broader legal and political community, yet still refuse
to enforce such a rule. One historical example, discussed above, is the Ohio
Supreme Court's refusal to rule on Salmon Chase's broad constitutional claim
that a slave became free the moment her master brought her to Ohio, while
signaling its agreement with his argument by having it printed and widely
publicized.3"2 The Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education contains
aspects of the same tension between norm articulation and norm enforcement. 3
This dichotomy is evident in the Brown Court's strong and unanimous
rejection of segregation as a constitutional norm, yet its refusal to order any
relief for the individual black plaintiffs, instead simply requiring the southern
states to desegregate "with all deliberate speed."304 Supreme Court decisions
since Brown have sometimes "attached as much significance, or more, to the
symbolism of laws as to their more tangible or material consequences."305
Yet a fundamental problem inheres in the separation between legal
meaning and the commitment to live by and enforce that meaning. As
Robert Cover notes, law cannot exist apart from both a legal narrative and a
commitment to that law.306 To Lon Fuller, unenforced norms strain the
concept of the "rule of law," because "[clongruence between [olfficial [a]ction

and [dieclared [riule" is an essential part of "the internal morality" of law. 7
Similarly, Professor Laurence Tribe argues that the articulation of norms for
symbolic purposes that are not enforced breeds a hypocrisy and cynicism that
undermines the rule of law in the Anglo-American tradition.0 Professor Owen
Fiss rejected an approach that would resolve the core dilemma in structural
reform litigation by confining the judge to the declaration of rights without
301.
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their enforcement because it "would require a detachment or an indifference to this world."3" Less philosophically and more doctrinally, the law
pronouncement approach is in tension with Article III courts' rejection of
advisory opinions and their avoidance of deciding difficult constitutional
issues unless absolutely necessary."'
The answer to the doctrinal problem is fairly straightforward. The advisory
opinion doctrine prevents a court from adjudicating hypothetical or moot
issues or controversies between adverse parties not before the court."' It does
not prevent the court from articulating the law governing an issue, or from
deciding an issue in the plaintiffs favor while denying relief on other grounds.
The rule does not mandate any particular order of deciding issues; it merely
requires 1that the issues be presented by adverse parties alleging an actual
dispute. 312
Nor does the principle, developed in the context of statutory interpretation, of not deciding difficult constitutional questions unless it is necessary
to do so, preclude the articulation of the principle approach suggested here.
The Supreme Court has recognized the propriety of sometimes addressing
an important constitutional question before turning to another, potentially
dispositive issue." 3 The value of avoiding difficult constitutional questions
is not absolute and must be balanced against the competing value of providing
guidance to the other branches of government. For example, in its decision
to create a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the Court held
that "[t]here is no need for courts to adopt the inflexible practice of always
deciding whether the officers' conduct manifested objective good faith before
turning to the question whether the Fourth Amendment has been
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violated."3' 14 Noting that "courts have considerable discretion in conforming
their decision-making processes to the exigencies of particular cases," the
Court stated that "[ilf the resolution of a particular Fourth Amendment question
is necessary to guide future action by law enforcement officers and magistrates, nothing will prevent reviewing courts from deciding that question
before turning to the good faith issue. 315
The more troubling problem is, therefore, the objection that by articulating a rule without enforcing it in the particular case, the Court states "no
more than the proclamation of an admittedly unworkable moral ideal."3 6
Professor Fritz Scharpf captures the essence of the quandary inhering in the
Court's lack of commitment to the principle it articulates:
What would be the persuasiveness of an interpretation of the Constitution
which the interpreter himself could not wish to see put into practice?
From what revelation should the Court derive authority to proclaim
moral postulates-or have its judgments any legitimacy beyond that
of an intellectual honesty disciplined by its responsibility for the
disposition of the concrete case?
... It would sacrifice that realism of constitutional interpretation
which is the necessary condition of its effectiveness. Interpretation
which would no longer be answerable to the real conditions and
exigencies of community life would transform constitutional law into a
collection of programmatic postulates to be worshiped on the Fourth of
July; and the easier it would be for the Court to retreat from conflicts
in the real world into the ideal realm of pure principle, the less ready
and able would it be to protect the community against transgression of
its fundamental code.11

It may well be that the enunciation of a principle without a commitment to enforce it would have the effect that Professor Scharpf describes and
cannot be considered law but mere rhetoric. But a judge's commitment to a
principle he or she articulates cannot be measured in pure all-or-nothing terms,
as Professor Scharpf suggests. Rather, judicial commitment comes in all shades
and hues, just as the community's commitment to its narratives of law can
take many forms.
As Robert Cover points out in Nomos and Narrative, there is a difference between the commitment demonstrated by a community that "writes
law review articles," forcing the officialdom to maintain its interpretation
314.
315.
316.
YALE L.J.
317.
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"merely by suffering the protest of the articles," and a community that disobeys
the criminal law, forcing judges to affirm the official interpretation of law
only by committing violence against the protestor."' To Cover, however,
both communities demonstrate a commitment to create and maintain law.
We certainly cheer more loudly for the civil resister; law review authors win
no Nobel Prizes. One clearly has a stronger commitment than the other, but
neither is merely dishonestly evoking an unworkable moral ideal. The soldier
who retreats in the face of a massive and uncontainable enemy assault in order
to take up a more defensible position from which to fight may have no less a
commitment to his nation's cause than the soldier who stands fast and dies.
So too, judicial commitment to constitutional liberty and justice takes
many forms, and cannot be measured simply by the heroic judge who affirms
justice at the peril of his office, his legitimacy, or his life. Certainly, Chief
Justice Marshall's dicta in Marbury that high executive officials are not above
the law has been accorded as much legitimacy as if he had ordered Marbury
appointed-particularly if the result of that decision would have been that
President Jefferson refused, and the Supreme Court's authority was consequently decisively weakened. Judge Greene, while (in my opinion wrongly)
declining to enforce the clear constitutional command that Congress
authorize war, nonetheless kept jurisdiction over Dellums' claim and suggested
that given the right circumstances in the future, he would, or more aptly might,
enforce the law. Had a majority of Congress voted down the authorization
for war when President Bush finally placed the issue before it in early January
1991, and had the president nevertheless proceeded to initiate war as he later
indicated he would have done," 9 Judge Greene might have enforced Article I
had a soldier or representative of Congress so requested. What Judge Greene
would have done
in that
not purely hypothetical
i320
woud
onein
hve
hatnotpurly
ypohetcalscenario.
is
conjecture;
quite possibly, he would have found yet another way to avoid issuing an
injunction. But certainly his opinion left open that possibility, and was not
purely abstract moralizing. It is not hard to see why, when another congressional war powers challenge to executive war making was raised some years
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later, the plaintiffs again sought to draw Judge Greene, despite his refusal to
grant relief in the Dellums case."'
The question of whether those who act as Judge Greene did are affirming or avoiding their constitutional responsibilities, must, in the final analysis,
be determined on a case-by-case basis where the context and circumstances of
each case is evaluated, and the court's specific decision is analyzed. My point
here is not to fashion a sweeping proposition either affirming or denying the
validity of such judicial action. Rather, it is to suggest that particularly in
cases where the litigation functions in whole or part as a forum for public
debate, judges should consider it as an option. That is especially true if the
judge is disposed to permit an injustice to continue because of his or her
reading of formal law or of the practical necessities of the situation. In some
cases, a judge's resort to this option may have the effect that Professor Scharpf
describes, making judges less ready and able to protect the community against
transgressions of its fundamental code. In others, it might help spur the political
movement in ways that may be more important than obtaining judicial relief.
How judges craft their opinion can help or harm the political or social
movement of which the plaintiff is but a representative. Congressman Dellums
certainly felt that Judge Greene helped his cause.
Judge Greene's decision upholding constitutional principle while granting the plaintiff no relief represents an extreme case of what in essence is a
fairly common and endemic problem in law reform litigation. The tension
between the role of courts in articulating rights and granting relief afflicts
many law reform cases. The reluctance of federal judges in the contemporary
conservative judicial climate to grant broad equitable relief has led many
lawyers to frame their cases narrowly and request fairly narrow relief in order
to increase their chances of winning in court. The result may be that the
plaintiffs win the case yet do not obtain the relief they really desire and seek.
Judge Greene's somewhat unusual judicial technique in Dellums thus reflects
a deeper, more pervasive dilemma present in many law reform cases.
Robert Cover ended his book Justice Accused with an insight about
judges: "If a man makes a good priest, we may be quite sure he will not be a
great prophet."3"' That insight sounds correct, but it may also be true that a good
priest may be able to aid, instead of obstruct, those that are prophets. Judges
are seldom great prophets, but the best can prove very valuable and helpful to
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a prophetic or redemptive constitutional movement that has as its primary
arena not the courtroom, but the streets.
V. THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN THE COURTS
AS FORUMS FOR PROTEST MODEL
That litigation can often have as a primary or significant purpose or
effect political mobilization and education outside the courtroom yields important insights for lawyers as well as judges. This model of litigation radically
redefines the role of a lawyer. The lawyer in presenting his or her case often
does not act as the neutral detached advocate posited by the traditional
model, nor even the less detached, elite, sympathetic and empathetic legal
expert of the law reform model. Rather, the lawyer is often not simply for the
movement, but in and of the political or social movement he or she represents;
"a lawyer can join the client as a comrade and serve in the role of legal advisor.""32
Activist attorneys use the term "movement lawyer" to express what they do
and how they view their role. For example, prominent socialist labor activist
attorney Staughton Lynd derived his legal role from the notion of "accompaniment" used by liberation theologians in Latin America. "This meant a duty
to accompany workers in their struggle for justice, to help them articulate their
interests, express their anger, and present their vision of a more just and
'
ultimately socialistic society."324
Many lawyers who bring litigation for broader
political purposes straddle the line between lawyer and political activist, as
did Salmon Chase, Staughton Lynd, or well-known civil rights lawyer, and
later Rutgers Law School professor Arthur Kinoy.
This conception of a lawyer's role leads to somewhat different legal
decisionmaking and strategies from those posited by both the traditional dispute
resolution model and the institutional litigation model. First, the decision
to bring a case, make an argument, or raise a claim cannot be based solely, or at
times even primarily, on an analysis of the legal merits. As Professor Kinoy, a
leading civil rights litigator of the 1950s through the 1970s explained in his
autobiographical book, Rights on Trial:
[T]he test of success for a people's lawyer is not always the technical
winning or losing of the formal proceeding. Again and again, the real
test was the impact of the legal activities on the morale and understanding of the people involved in the struggle. To the degree that the
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legal work helped to develop a sense of strength, an ability to fight
back, it was successful. This could even be achieved without reaching
the objective of formal victory.

325

Thus, for Professor Kinoy, the decision whether to bring a lawsuit could not
'
326
be based solely on "the likelihood of success within the court structure."
Rather, the question was what role the lawsuit would play in the people's
struggle. "If it helped the fight, then it was done, even if the chances of imme'
diate legal success were virtually nonexistent."327
This approach requires such movement lawyers to take risks in bringing cases that present difficult, uphill battles and could create bad precedent.
For many traditional law reform litigators, such as former NAACP Legal
Defense Fund general counsel Jack Greenberg, test cases generally "should
'
To be sure, the likely legal
not be brought if they are likely to be lost."328
success of a case should be carefully considered before it is brought, and the
risk of creating bad precedent should be weighed, but under the public
protest model of reform litigation that cannot be the sole, or at times even
the primary, consideration. For example, in Danville, South Carolina,
Kinoy and William Kunstler pioneered the use of the long-dormant federal
329
removal statute to prevent state prosecutions of civil rights activists. Jack
Greenberg, then the legal director of the NAACP Inc. Fund, completely
rejected the idea of using this old Reconstruction-era statute to stop the state
court trials of the demonstrators, calling it a crazy idea amounting to "playing
with the courts. 330 But, despite the reservations of many of the lawyers, and
the lack of legal precedent, Kinoy and Kunstler decided to try, for there were
no other good alternatives and the civil rights movement was pressing for
some legal action. Miraculously, Kinoy and the other Danville lawyers
331
temporarily won an injunction in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Similarly, "when the first Holocaust restitution lawsuit was filed in
October 1996 against the Swiss banks, most legal observers viewed the suit as
a 'sure loser."'3 2 Yet the suit obviously had a political motive to create public
embarrassment and put political pressure on the Swiss banks by exposing
KINOY, supra note 22, at 57-58.
325.
Id. at 71.
326.
Id.
327.
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their role in the Holocaust. The suit, a "legal loser," succeeded in that aim.
"Less than two years later, the Swiss banks were [willing] to pay $1.25 billion
333
to end the litigation.
Most cases brought in the face of unfavorable precedent undoubtedly lose
in court. They therefore may create bad precedent, although in most instances
they simply pile more bad precedent on an already poor situation. Some cases
do contain a silver lining when the judges draft their opinions in a manner to
create room for the law to grow and develop despite the defeat in court. 334 But
generally, while the risk of creating bad precedent ought clearly to be weighed
before litigation is *commenced, lawyers ought not to allow a fear of losing
to paralyze their work, stifle creativity, or make them overly cautious. Thus,
lawyers who utilize the courts as forums for protest must balance the risk of
creating bad precedent against the other, more political aims of the lawsuit,
and recognize that often the aim of litigation extends beyond winning or losing
in court. This balancing is therefore different from the questions faced by
lawyers operating within either of the two more mainstream models of litigation.
Another critical lesson mandated by the courts as forums of protests
model is that public interest lawyers must draft their complaints and argue
their cases before the courts based not simply on the technical, legal arguments, but on the broad moral and political themes that will resonate with
their clients, the political movement they represent, the general public, and
often judges. Salmon Chase and the other antislavery lawyers understood
this when they framed their legal arguments as broad moral and constitutional broadsides against slavery. These arguments might not, and in fact
often did not, convince a court, but the antislavery arguments were effective
because they emphasized both the immorality of slavery and the absolute
incongruity of democracy and slavery.335
The Shelley v. Kraemer336 case presents another example of a lawyer
making a broad moral and political argument that might make an impression
on a judge, but will more likely resonate in the public debate. George
Vaughn, a municipal court lawyer in St. Louis who had brought the Shelley
333.
Id. Bazyler also observes that in December 1999, "Germany and its industry ... agreed to
pay [$4.8 billion to settle Holocaust slave labor claims], just months after two New Jersey federal
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36-37.
334.
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case to the Supreme Court, argued the restrictive covenant cases along with
the NAACP's Thurgood Marshall.337 Philip Elman, an attorney in the
Solicitor General's office who helped draft the government's brief in Shelley
and attended the oral arguments, recounts Vaughn's argument:
He made an argument that as a professional piece of advocacy was
not particularly distinguished. You might even say it was poor. He
mainly argued the thirteenth amendment, which wasn't before the
Court. He tried to distinguish cases when it was clear that the cases
were indistinguishable and the only way to deal with them was to
ignore or overrule them.... It was a dull argument until he came to
the very end. He concluded his argument by saying... "Now I've
finished my legal argument, but I want to say this before I sit down. In
this Court, this house of law, the Negro today stands outside, and he
knocks on the door, over and over again, he knocks on the door and
cries out, 'Let me in, let me in, for I too have helped build this house."'
All of a sudden there was drama in the courtroom, a sense of what
the case was really all about rather than the technical legal arguments... .[It was] the most moving plea in the Court I've ever
heard.33

Vaughn was so inspiring that "he was invited to repeat [his speech] at the
1948 Democratic National Convention. 339
The example of George Vaughn making compelling emotional, moral,
arguments, and poorly arguing the technical legal distinctions
political
and
that are the daily grist of an appellate lawyer's life, is extreme. Indeed, in many
cases, it is precisely the broad moral, political, and legal arguments that place
more technical legal points in their proper context, and, if made, properly can
influence both the judges hearing the case and the broad public to whom the
lawyer seeks to appeal. Many more polished and experienced oral advocates
than Vaughn have recognized that to convince both judges and the public,
one often has to cut through the narrow technical legal arguments with a
broad plea to justice and morality. For example, Harold Koh, who argued the
Haitian Refugee case before the U.S. Supreme Court, started his argument with
a broad plea about the injustice of the U.S. government's policy, hoping that
his opening might convince the Court to view his technical arguments more
See William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group
337.
Members and Lauryers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1627-33 (1997). As Rubenstein
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Id. at 1630 (quoting Philip Elman & Norman Silber, The Solicitor General's Office,
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favorably, but recognizing that even if it did not, it would appeal to his
broader audience.34 °
Another example of a case which was litigated and argued to the U.S.
Supreme Court with politics and public opinion uppermost in the advocate's
"
mind was Planned Parenthood v. Casey.34
' Kathryn Kolbert, the attorney who
argued Casey, maintains that "the entire case was litigated on the theory that
we were going to lose, and that the issue of reproductive choice would be
'
going back to the political arena."342
Accordingly, "her clients wanted her to
focus on the big picture-the continuing viability of Roe v. Wade-rather
than the particular provisions of the law, such as the requirement that
'
married women seeking an abortion notify their husbands."343
In her oral
argument, Kolbert therefore heavily focused on "the importance of preserving
[a woman's right to choose whether to have an] abortion as a fundamental
right, prompting Justice Sandra Day O'Connor at one point to ask her if she
was ever going to discuss the specific provisions of the law. 3 44 Kolbert's
strategy was to force the Court to rule on whether to preserve Roe, reasoning
that even if they lost, which she thought likely, the courtroom defeat would
galvanize public opinion and bring a legion of pro-choice politicians into
office in the upcoming national elections.345 Fortunately, the Court reaffirmed that a woman's right to choose was a fundamental right.
Public interest lawyers also have to look at the interaction between the
litigation and the broader interests of their clients and the movements they
represent, not only in arguing their cases, but in drafting their complaints.
Many lawyers feel constrained in drafting pleadings by their perception of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requirement of notice pleadings,346 and the
constraints of professional standards. Lawyers therefore draft complaints that
lose the details, passion and identity of their clients and thereby do not
convey the full story of the oppression and injustice their clients suffered. 47
A model of litigation that focuses not on the technical arguments before the
court but on the broader purposes of the lawsuit supports drafting complaints
340.
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in a manner that tells the client's full narrative and the richness of his or her
story. Consequently, the judge assigned to the case is able to comprehend the
plaintiffs full outrage, and, additionally, the media and the public can
understand the plaintiffs dramatic and compelling story."'
By persuading a lawyer to think not only of the technical arguments that
will win in court, but also which arguments will serve the movement with
which he or she is working, the forum for protest model is more receptive to
transformative arguments that look beyond the outcome of the particular
legal battle and serve to transform political consciousness and reshape the
49
way legal conflicts are represented in the law. Lawyers who pay attention
to the broader political aims of their clients and political movements when
they draft complaints and argue beffre courts may temper some of the
limitations of law reform litigation articulated by the Critical Legal Studies
Movement and other progressive scholars. But that strategy raises new
contradictions. Those new tensions are generated by what often is a conflict
between broad political, moral or legal arguments and the often narrow
terrain that lawyers are forced to work in. That conflict envelops many law
reform cases, particularly those in which the lawyers' and litigants' goals are
broader than just winning in court.
The litigation forum often channels legal argument into forms that are
likely to persuade a judge, but are not necessarily what the lawyers, litigants
or political movements believe represent justice. For example, Professor
Charles Lawrence has discussed this dilemma in the context of whether and
how to support the diversity defense of affirmative action. In the short run,
that legal strategy is most likely to succeed in the contemporary judicial
climate, yet it leaves unchallenged and indeed affirms a university's role in
perpetuating and entrenching a privileged elite. For the lawyer using the
courts as a forum both to protest and hopefully to ultimately transform the
social, political and economic injustices of our society, the dilemma is particularly acute, for he or she, unlike the theorist, must work daily in the judicial
arena. For that lawyer, one question is how to introduce what Professor
Lawrence terms "transformative arguments" into litigation, and to use that
litigation to inform the political dialogue."' Generally, the institutional law
reform model does not address this dilemma, because this problem focuses
See id. at 771-72.
348.
See Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory
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more on the relationship between lawyers and the political movements they
work with and less on the role of the judge in a particular case.
For some constitutional theorists, the solution is to abandon the effort to
articulate progressive, transformative or aspirational norms in the courts." '
Some civil rights litigators, however, reject that approach and continue to
view litigation not merely as a means to reform institutions, but as one forum
among many to raise questions that may eventually transform contemporary,
mainstream political dialogue.
This question was starkly presented in litigation challenging U.S. Steel's
plant closings in Youngstown, Ohio in the late 1970s.32 An attorney in that
case, Staughton Lynd, had articulated a promissory estoppel theory that he
believed was supported by contract lav. 3"3 U.S. Steel had made a promise to
keep the Youngstown mills open if they could be made profitable. The workers
had agreed to a variety of concessions, worked hard, and relied on that
promise to their detriment, yet U.S. Steel had breached its promise. The
promissory estoppel theory, in Lynd's view, both articulated the workers'
feelings of injustice and posed a radical challenge to traditional management
rights.354
But the district court judge raised a much more radical theory, positing
that the Youngstown community had perhaps acquired some vested property
rights in U.S. Steel from the lengthy, long-established relationship between
U.S. Steel and the Youngstown community. 5
Ultimately, the judge
concluded that there was no legal precedent for such a property right,
dismissed the "property right" claim, and found that U.S. Steel had not
breached any promise to keep the mills running."6
The workers appealed and Lynd wrote a brief arguing for the workers'
contract claim. But Lynd could not write a brief arguing for a community
property right for which there was no precedent. Lynd's socialist politics led
him to believe that while he could use the law to win concrete victories and
raise issues, the limitations of capitalist laws had to be recognized, understood,
and explained. While Lynd was perfectly willing to bring a "prophetic" case
351.
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for which there was some legal precedent, even if for political reasons the case
would likely lose, he was unwilling to argue a case with no supporting
precedent. The role of a radical labor lawyer, Lynd thought, is to articulate
the workers' feelings of injustice in a manner that the law could recognize. If
the law did not recognize the workers' complaint as actionable, then the
lawyer's role was to relay that to the workers, and develop another strategy for
fighting the injustice.357
However, although Lynd was unwilling to argue the community property right issue to the court of appeals, there was a respected national legal
group and a prominent national lawyer willing to fill the void. The Center
for Constitutional Rights (CCR) submitted an amicus brief, signed by Arthur
Kinoy, by then a professor at Rutgers Law School, that argued for a community property right to prevent a company in U.S. Steel's position from
unilaterally deciding to close mills vital to that community."'
Professors Kinoy and Lynd had differing approaches to the dilemma
359
'
Local unions were actively
presented by "transformative arguments."
of whether the Constitution
questions
engaged in struggle, raising fundamental
protected not merely civil and political rights, but also economic rights.
Irrespective of whether legal precedent supported a community property
right, Professor Kinoy believed that people's lawyers had to find and use
whatever they could to argue that the Constitution supported such rights-a
position that would help motivate workers across America to struggle
against plant closing. He hoped that the mass labor movement around
plant closings would have the same impact as the civil rights movement
had on the courts in the 1960s. 3"
While Lynd's approach recognizes the limits of law and using litigation
both to advance particular struggle and to help explain, educate and expose
the nature of capitalist law, for Professor Kinoy, the law and the Constitution
are fundamentally indeterminate vessels, with their meaning determined not
361
by legal precedent, but by the political struggle of the masses. Articulating
radical rights, such as economic and social rights, both in the context of
litigation as well as in political forums, can, for Professor Kinoy, motivate
thousands of people to struggle for those rights which in turn will impact the
courts.362 For Professor Kinoy, the paradigm for this courts as forums for
357.
358.
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protest model was the mass, democratic civil rights struggle during the
1960s. It was during this period that Professor Kinoy articulated radical,
transformative notions of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments,
363
which, at times, were accepted by the courts.
The different approaches to law and constitutional rights taken by
Professors Kinoy and Lynd reflect longstanding tensions in the radical
movement's view of the Constitution and of litigation that commenced with
the split within the abolitionist movement over whether the Constitution,
properly interpreted, outlawed slavery. Lynd sympathized with the abolitionists
who had accurately viewed the Constitution as having accepted slavery and
thus had called on antislavery judges to resign, as opposed to those abolitionists, such as Alvan Stewart, who had proposed radical reinterpretations of the
Constitution based on theories of natural law and natural rights.3 4 Professor
Kinoy's view hewed closer to that of Alvan Stewart and Senator Charles
Summer, who argued in court and elsewhere that the Constitution should
always be interpreted in favor of liberty, equality, and human rights.365
My intellectual predilection lies more with Lynd's approach, which
captures critical theory's emphasis on exposing the contradictions and limitations of law, and the litigators' focus on presenting arguments to the judge
based on precedent However, Professor Kinoy was able to use his approach
effectively in the 1960s to help use litigation to mobilize thousands of civil
rights activists and law students to engage in potentially transformative litigation.3" What this suggests is that solutions to the dilemma must come in a
case-by-case context, and that in some eras and cases Professor Kinoy's approach
may have the invaluable effect he sought. It did not in the Youngstown case.67
Perhaps the main contribution of the courts as forums for protest model is
simply to articulate the dilemma of attempting to make transformative
arguments in the context of litigation, thereby forcing litigators to attempt to
grapple with the problem and not ignore it.
The courts as forums for protest model forces lawyers to address other
contradictions that face progressive lawyers. Lawyers who undertake this type
of litigation must be both willing to support their clients' political actions and
mount public educational campaigns that dovetail and interface with the
363.

KINOY, supra note 22, at 177-208; Arthur Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro

Freedom, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 387, 426-27 (1967).
364.
See generally COVER, supra note 82 (explaining the different positions taken by the
Garrisonian abolitionist versus the Stewart wing of the abolitionist movement).
365.
See id.

366.
367.

LOBEL, supra note 321, at 142-47.
Id. at 147-48.
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litigation. 6 Yet, often clients' political actions cause problems with a law
reformer's carefully calibrated legal or political strategy. For example, in the
Haitian refugee litigation, the Haitians' hunger strike pushed the popular
'
While the strike led
mobilization beyond the "legal team's grand plan."369
to a very successful organizing educational effort around the case, it caused
division amongst the legal team as to whether the strike and resulting
publicity was helpful or harmful. 7 °
Similarly, a model of litigation that focuses on the political goals of a
movement has the potential to come into conflict with the needs and interests of the individual clients who are the plaintiffs in the lawsuit. This
problem is also endemic to public interest litigation generally, particularly
class action litigation, where often the interests of the lawyer, the clients,
and the political movement are in tension.37 Successfully navigating this
inherent tension requires that the lawyers pay close attention to fostering
democratic decisionmaking in the lawsuit, and to the particular interests of
the individuals and groups concerned, and not simply act based on their
own legal or political instincts and principles. Indeed, while some scholars
like Derrick Bell argue that a class action should serve as a vehicle for organizing class members to promote the class's interest,372 empirical studies of
class actions reveal "very little if any active attempt by lawyers to organize
class members to participate in the suit or to engage in other activities
complementary to the suit." 3 ' The courts as forums for protest model requires
lawyers to change that perspective."'
368.
See GERALD LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE
LAw PRACTICE 3 (1992) (decrying activist lawyers who never thought of mounting public educational campaigns).
369.
Ratner, supra note 15, at 208-11.
370.
See id.
371.
See Rubenstein, supra note 337, at 1625-26 & n.8.
372.
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 513 (1976).
373.
Bryant Garth et al., The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives From an
Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 380-81 (1988).
374.
In 2001, I was one of a team of lawyers who brought a class action lawsuit challenging
cruel and unusual conditions at an Ohio Supermaximum Prison and due process violations in the
placement and retention of prisoners at that prison. Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D.
Ohio 2002), affd in part, rev'd in part, 372 F.3d 346 (6th Cit. 2001). The prisoners at the Ohio
Supermax were housed there indefinitely, some for many years in over twenty-three hours a day solitary confinement with no outdoor recreation and virtually no contact with other humans. We operated
on a key principle that the approximately fifteen named class representatives were to democratically
discuss and vote on any reasonable settlement offer and discuss basic strategies for trial and that our
litigation tactics would be developed in dialogue with two prison leaders. The state of Ohio's
attorneys strenuously objected to our holding group meetings with the named plaintiffs, claiming that
these prisoners were the "worst of the worst" in the Ohio prison system, could not rationally and
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I conclude with a discussion of the litigation brought on behalf of the

prisoners being held by the United States at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This
important litigation fits comfortably within the courts as forums for protest
model, and illustrates many of the insights and contradictions of the model.
In early 2002, the CCR challenged the Bush Administration's detention
of suspected Taliban and Al Qaeda prisoners at Guantanamo Bay without
affording them the protections or rights mandated by the Geneva Convention
and human rights norms.375 At the time, many individuals and organizations

were timid about openly challenging the administration's antiterrorism
policies.376 Moreover, a case on behalf of the Guantanamo detainees presented
a particularly difficult context to challenge the administration. These prisoners
had been captured in and around Afghanistan as part of a popular war effort.
The memory of September 11 was fresh in people's minds. The government
claimed that what it was doing at Guantanamo was necessary to defend
American national security and prevent future terrorist attacks, a claim that
resonates particularly strongly with the courts. Most important, Johnson v.
Eisentrager,3 ' decided by the Supreme Court in 1950, held that nonresident
enemy aliens, after being convicted of war crimes by a military tribunal
(detained by the U.S. government outside of U.S. territory) had no right or
privilege to avail themselves of the jurisdiction of a U.S. court to challenge
their detentions.
While the legal and political climate was bleak, the CCR attorneys
believed that Johnson was distinguishable and that it was possible to win in
court. The CCR decided to take the risk.378 The government's position was
in clear violation of the Geneva Convention as well as due process and was in
effect saying that no law applied to these detainees. But the CCR's objective
objectively discuss settlement offers, and would present grave security concerns if allowed to meet as
a group. Eventually, pursuant to the threat of court order, the state did allow us to have several group
meetings with the prisoners under draconian conditions in which each prisoner was locked in an
individual cell, with only a small opening through which they could see us and we could see their
face and hear their voice. The cells were adjacent to each other so that all the named plaintiffs could
fit in one wing with their lawyers seated at a table facing the cells. Despite the state officials'
prediction, the prisoners engaged in serious, rational, and informative discussion with each other and
their lawyers, reaching consensus on accepting one settlement offer, rejecting another, and agreeing
on the basic strategies for trial.
375.
Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002), affd sub nom. Al Odah v. United
States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir 2003), rev'd sub nom. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
376.
See Adam Liptak & Michael Janofsky, Scrappy Group of Lawyers Shows Way for Big Firms,
N.Y. TMEs, June 30, 2004, at A14. ('"Early on, we felt very, very isolated because we were going against
the grain of the superpatriotism around us,' Ron Daniels, executive director of the center, said.").
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L.J.,
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went beyond winning or losing in court. Its objective was to demonstrate that
there was resistance to U.S. policy, to help publicize the injustice to, and
plight of, the detainees, to keep the issue of the detainees in the public mind,
and to use the case as part of a broader political movement against the
administration's antiterrorism policies. The decision to litigate was not based
on whether the CCR attorneys thought the litigation had a good chance of
winning in court.
The CCR first filed a complaint with the Inter-American Commission
of Human Rights of the Organization of American States, which ruled that
the Guantanamo prisoners may not be held "entirely at the unfettered discretion of the United States government," and that the government must
accord those prisoners a hearing to determine their legal status.379 The Bush
Administration predictably refused to comply with the Commission's ruling.
Indeed, given the certainty that the administration would not comply with
any unfavorable Commission ruling, the purpose of the complaint was to
obtain an authoritative ruling, and to use that ruling to mobilize international and domestic public opinion against the administration's Guantanamo
policies.
The CCR also brought a federal lawsuit on behalf of several of the detained
prisoners. The federal district court, and then the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, ruled unanimously in the government's favor.38 °
Nonetheless, the CCR persisted, and the Supreme Court decided in November
2003 to hear its appeal.38
The Guantanamo case had an impact even before the Supreme Court
handed down its June 2004 decision reversing the court of appeals. For over
two years, the case helped keep the outrageous Guantanamo situation in the
public eye and galvanized international protest. News reports sparked outrage
at keeping the detainees in what British judges termed a "legal black
hole. 382 Amicus briefs submitted to the Supreme Court from former federal
judges, former senior American diplomats, former American POWs, former
Judge Advocates General of the Navy and top Marine Corps lawyers, the Bar
Association representing the fifty-four nations of the former British
Commonwealth, and the International Bar Association reflected and fanned
379.
Decision on Request for Precautionary Measures (Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba),
Inter-Am. C.H.R. (Mar. 12, 2002), reprinted in part in 41 ILM 532-34 (2002).
380.
Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002), affd sub nom. Al Odah v. United
States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nor. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
381.
Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 534 (2003).
382.
R. v. Sec'y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2002] EWCA Civ. 1598, at
T 22, available at 2002 WL 31452052.
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the widespread protest against the U.S. Guantanamo policy." 3 That protest,
combined with Supreme Court review, compelled the administration to
release a number of the prisoners, even before the Supreme Court announced
its decision.384
The question the case presented to the Supreme Court was narrow and
involved only whether federal courts have jurisdiction to consider the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad and held at Guantanamo Bay.38
Thus, at that stage of the litigation, the specific relief being requested of the
Court was minimal (although the implications of the Court grant of that
relief are significant), namely, a holding that federal courts have jurisdiction
to hear plaintiffs' habeas petitions. On remand, the district court will determine what rights the plaintiffs have, and to what process they are entitled.
Because the issue before the Court was solely jurisdictional, the plaintiffs were
able to obtain a ruling articulating the basic norm that executive detentions,
even in wartime, cannot be lawless. Yet because the issue was framed jurisdictionally, neither the plaintiffs nor the Court had to grapple immediately
with the exact contours of the plaintiffs' rights and the potential remedies
to which they may be entitled.
The Supreme Court's assertion of jurisdiction to hear the case is a tremendous victory. It articulates and gives meaning to a fundamental constitutional principle: that executive detentions of prisoners outside the United
States cannot operate entirely outside the law or without some legal process.
While the Court's decision addresses only the applicability of the writ of
habeas corpus to the detention of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the
implications of the Court's holding are broad; as Justice Scalia correctly notes
in his dissent, the Court's decision potentially applies to prisoners held by the
military in other places. Moreover, while the Court merely asserted federal
court jurisdiction to determine the legality of the Executive's potentially indefinite detention of individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing,
footnote fifteen of Justice Stevens' majority opinion states that the plaintiffs'
claims "unquestionably describe 'custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States. ' '38 6 That footnote, in which Justice Stevens
cities Justice Kennedy's concurrence in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,387
383.
See Douglas W. Cassel, Jr., The Founding Fathers Knew Better, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
Oct. 17, 2003, at 6.
384.
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Mar. 17, 2004, at A6.
385.
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clearly indicates that on the merits, the plaintiffs have constitutional due
process rights which a court must recognize.
The Court's mere assertion of jurisdiction in the Guantanamo case has
dramatically affected governmental conduct. Indeed, the Supreme Court's
decision to hear the Guantanamo case had a strong impact on the government's behavior even before the Court announced its ruling, leading to the
release of many prisoners and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's decision that
some process would be established to determine whether a prisoner should
continue to be detained. 88 Only eight days after the Supreme Court's decision, the Department of Defense announced that procedures to inform the
Guantanamo prisoners of their rights and to review their detention would
be implemented. 9 The government has thus moved quickly to establish some
due process for the prisoners, although the prisoners' lawyers have severely
criticized that process and seek hearings before federal district courts. Therefore,
the process owed plaintiffs will be back before the courts fairly quickly.
Finally, the Guantanamo case also illustrates the limitations of litigation
to transform the public dialogue. For some of the lawyers at the CCR, the most
fundamental issue involved in the case is the Executive's use of the wartime
paradigm to detain and prosecute people who should be prosecuted under civilian
law. These attorneys would want to challenge whether the "war against
terrorism" truly fits within the definition of a war, or whether Al Qaeda should
be treated as a criminal conspiracy and its members prosecuted under ordinary
civilian law.39° But a challenge in the Guantanamo case to whether the war
against Al Qaeda is really a war for constitutional or international purposes
would have little chance of success in the courts.391 Therefore, these attorneys

Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Remarks to Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce (Feb. 13,
388.
2004) ("For those detainees who pose a continued threat and who do not need to be detained the U.S.
government is instituting a process for an annual review."), available at http://www.defenselink.mil
transcripts/2004/tr20040213-0445.html.
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See Kathleen T. Rhem, Detainee Status Review Tribunals to Begin Within Weeks, AM.
FORCES PRESS SERVICE, July 9, 2004, at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Ju12004/n070920042004070902.html; see also Kathleen T. Rhem, DoD to Review Status of All Guantanamo Detainees,
AM. FORCES PRESS SERVICE, July 8, 2004, at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/ul2004/n07082004_
2004070801.html.
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detentions and then argues that the protections of those laws contained in the Geneva Convention
are inapplicable because these prisoners are "unlawful combatants."
391.
The courts will undoubtedly be asked to review the different question of whether an
alleged Al Qaeda member or supporter not captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan but rather
in some other country can be treated as an enemy combatant subject to the laws of war, and not
civilian law.

560

52 UCLA LAW REVIEW 477 (2004)

are relegated to making that more fundamental point in their public speaking
about the case, and not in court.
However, the filing and the arguing of the case at its various stages has
resulted in a large amount of publicity in the United States and abroad, resulting in pressure on the government to discontinue this lawless policy. Such
publicity can have various effects throughout society. It can encourage people
to engage in discussion about their views on that particular situation. It can
generate support for the movements advocating the various sides of the issue.
It could even result in bringing new financial resources, and organizational or
legal talent, to the movement. Thus, movement attorneys should realize that
litigation and publicity should go together hand in hand as part of an overall
strategy that will result in eventual success, even if that success is temporarily
delayed by defeats in the courts.
The Guantanamo litigation is but a recent example of the long tradition
in this country of using courts as one arena of protest. That case started as a
lonely protest against an illegal government policy. The case was originally
viewed as hopeless by most legal observers and rejected by the lower courts.
Many observers might even initially have said that no reasonable lawyer
could have any hope for success. The publicity and international outrage
surrounding the Guantanamo policy helped force the Supreme Court to take
the case seriously and eventually rule for the plaintiffs. Yet the fundamental
lesson of the Guantanamo case is not to be found in the important Supreme
Court victory, but in the decision of a dedicated group of lawyers to litigate
the case in order to protest the administration's policy despite the seemingly
difficult odds of success.
CONCLUSION

The courts as forums for protest model differs from the traditional, private dispute standard on institutional reform, the two models traditionally
described by legal scholars. The reduced emphasis on winning or losing and
the lesser role of the judge are two features that distinguish this model from
the others. Our nation has seen a long tradition of litigators and movements
using the courts as platforms for arguing controversial positions and garnering
public support for them. From the Revolutionary period, through this country's
struggle with the issues of slavery and women's suffrage, up until modem
instances where private citizens and public officials have attempted to
challenge governmental actions, our system's courts have been used as forums
to stir debate by the citizenry.
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Because of the importance of encouraging people to engage in discussion

about current social issues, and because of the implications for freedom of
speech, courts should not allow sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11 or other similar rules to stifle popular debate stirred by lawsuits that may
be considered "frivolous" because they argue against precedent or are viewed
as losing cases. Bringing a lawsuit to generate publicity for one's cause should
not be viewed as an improper purpose under Rule 11.
Under the courts as forums for protest model, judges will often find
themselves in a difficult position: They will be faced with a situation where
legal precedent and social and political reality collide. Though articulating
a legal principle while deciding a case without enforcing that principle may
seem problematic, judges should feel comfortable doing so when it is necessary in order to encourage society and governmental actors to remedy an
injustice that will otherwise continue unchecked.
Finally, progressive attorneys should adapt to this model as well. Realizing that litigation is part of an overall strategy that should include publicity
and other forms of political action, they should become involved with the
groups and movements they represent, and shape their litigation strategy so
that it will dovetail with the overall goals of those movements.

